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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The traditional doctrine of assumption of the risk was a potent defense 
that sheltered negligent defendants from liability to injured plaintiffs in a 
wide variety of settings ranging from injuries at sporting events1 to 
employees injured on the job prior to the enactment of workers’ 
compensation legislation.2  The focus of this consent-based defense was 
on whether there was a “voluntary acceptance [by the plaintiff] of a 
specific, known and appreciated risk.”3 
That defense had been narrowed to the point of virtual extinction by 
the liberal California Supreme Court of the pre-1986 era.4  The lawmaking 
 
 1. See Brown v. S.F. Baseball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). 
 2. See Lamson v. Am. Ax & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900). 
 3. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 715 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 4. See generally Neil M. Levy & Edmund Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the 
Crossroads, 67 CAL. L. REV. 497 (1979). 
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style of that court has been described by supporters and detractors as a 
“policy oriented judicial activism . . . remaking the entire body of tort law” 
by eliminating barriers to recovery for negligently injured plaintiffs.5  
That lawmaking style is equally characteristic of the more conservative 
court of the post-1986 era, but the present-day court’s policy preference 
has been to limit these avenues to recovery.  Nowhere is this more apparent 
than in the area of assumption of the risk. 
In a series of cases, beginning in 1992, this more conservative court 
has reinvented the doctrine of assumption of the risk, replacing the 
traditional consent-based defense with a potentially far reaching regime 
of no-duty rules.  The court’s major focus in this endeavor has been the 
development of no-duty rules applicable to sporting activities.  On one 
level, these no-duty-for-sports rules are straightforward.  As the court 
explained in a trilogy of decisions with opinions written by Chief Justice 
George, “as a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to recognize a 
duty of care when to do so would require that an integral part of the sport 
be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in sporting 
events.”6  Based on this policy, the court in its 1992 decision in Knight v. 
Jewett held that coparticipants in active sports breach a duty of care to 
each other only if they “intentionally injure[] another player or engage[] 
in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the 
ordinary activity involved in the sport.”7  In Knight and in subsequent 
decisions expanding the reach of this “intentional injury/recklessness” 
rule, the court has been careful to point out that different categories of 
defendants play different roles in sports injury cases, “including owners 
of sports facilities, manufacturers of sports equipment, and coaches and 
instructors.”8  To determine whether the intentional injury/recklessness 
rule should be extended to relieve these categories of defendants from a 
duty of due care, courts are to focus on the “nature of the sport itself[,] . . . 
the defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport[,]” and the policy 
considerations that might justify relieving a defendant from a duty of 
reasonable care.9 
 
 5. Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises—One Step 
Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820, 823 (1975); see also James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 
IND. L.J. 467, 468 (1976). 
 6. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003). 
 7. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711. 
 8. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 39. 
 9. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709. 
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Unfortunately, things are not this simple.  Knight and subsequent cases 
also appear to have endorsed a second no-duty rule that is analytically 
distinct from the sports participant intentional injury/recklessness rule 
and the framework and policies of that rule.  As stated by Knight, 
“defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a 
plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.”10  The only apparent 
criterion for the invocation of this no-duty rule appears to be a court’s 
determination that a risk posed by a defendant is an inherent risk of an 
activity in which the plaintiff is engaged.  This is a true no-duty rule, not 
a “limited-duty” rule such as the intentional injury/recklessness rule.  If 
the court finds a risk is inherent, summary judgment is appropriate. 
We write that Knight and subsequent cases appear to endorse the 
inherent risk no-duty rule because, unlike the intentional injury/ 
recklessness rule, the inherent risk no-duty rule has not been responsible 
for any of the California Supreme Court’s holdings exempting defendants 
from a duty of due care.  These holdings have been based on the intentional 
injury/recklessness rule.  The inherent risk no-duty rule, however, has 
figured in court of appeal decisions11 and has been the central,12 and at 
times exclusive,13 focus of highly critical academic commentary.  Dylan 
Esper and Gregory Keating, for example, see these decisions as “abusing 
duty” by intruding on the traditional role of juries to make determinations of 
negligence.14  We share this concern.  We also note that this inherent risk 
no-duty rule has been held by lower courts to relieve owners of sports 
facilities from a duty of due care, thus bypassing the analytic and policy 
framework carefully established under the intentional injury/recklessness 
rule.  These courts have ignored the insistence by Knight and subsequent 
California Supreme Court decisions that before relieving defendants 
from a duty of due care, courts should focus on the “nature of the sport 
itself[,] . . . the defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport[,]” and 
whether imposing “a duty of care . . . would require that an integral part 
of the sport be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in 
sporting events.”15 
 
 10. Id. at 708. 
 11. See, e.g., Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995). 
 12. See, e.g., Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 265 (2006). 
 13. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending 
to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve 
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 334 (2006). 
 14. Esper & Keating, supra note 12. 
 15. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709; Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 
(Cal. 2003). 
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The inherent risk no-duty rule, in addition, has been the source of 
confused, or at least confusing, analysis.  In its 1997 decision in Parsons 
v. Crown Disposal Co., for example, the court wrote: 
[T]here are circumstances in which the relationship between defendant and 
plaintiff gives rise to a duty on the part of the defendant to use due care not to 
increase the risks inherent in the plaintiff’s activity.  For example, a purveyor of 
recreational activities owes a duty to a patron not to increase the risks inherent 
in the activity in which the patron has paid to engage. . . . Likewise, a coach or 
sport instructor owes a duty to a student not to increase the risks inherent in the 
learning process undertaken by the student.16 
A person who is not well versed in the law in this area could well 
assume from this passage that purveyors of recreational activities and 
coaches or sports instructors owe a similar duty to injured persons and 
that this is a duty of due care.  In fact, however, they may owe different 
duties.  Coaches and instructors, as we will see, only owe a duty to 
refrain from intentionally injuring the athlete or engaging in reckless 
conduct totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the 
sport.  Purveyors of recreational activities, in contrast, may owe patrons 
a duty of due care—except with respect to risks that a court may 
determine are inherent in the sport.  In cases where a risk is considered 
to be inherent in the sport, the defendant may not owe a duty of due care, 
but this is not because of the intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule.  
Rather, it is because of the no-duty-for-inherent-risk rule.  So, even in 
this situation, the duties owed by coaches or instructors and purveyors of 
recreational activities are not the same.17 
But enough with this confusion.  In this Article, we hope to untangle 
the confused no-duty-for-sports rules the court has created over the past 
decade and a half.  We will argue that much of this confusion stems from 
the court’s carrying over terminology and concepts of the traditional 
assumption of the risk defense.  In Part II, we set forth the law of 
assumption of the risk as it stood prior to the court’s decision in Knight.  
Parts III through V then carefully trace the adoption and elaboration of 
the no-duty-for-sports doctrine.  These Parts attempt to expose the roots 
 
 16. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 86–87 (Cal. 1997) (citations 
omitted). 
 17. The confusion continues to this day.  In the 2006 decision of Avila v. Citrus 
Community College District, for example, the court wrote that “coaches and instructors 
have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports participation . . . [and] those 
responsible for maintaining athletic facilities have a similar duty not to increase the 
inherent risks . . . .” 131 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006). 
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of the confusion that surround this doctrine.  In Part VI, we suggest ways 
in which the court could clarify duty analysis in this area while retaining 
the basic analytic and policy framework laid out in Knight.  We will 
explain, for example, that employment of the inherent risk concept 
serves no analytic purpose.  It can only lead to confusion, and that label 
should be abandoned.  The concept of inherent risk has also been carried 
over from the older cases.  We will explain that the court of appeal 
decisions that have employed this concept can be better understood as 
decisions in which the court has determined that, as a matter of law, the 
defendant was not negligent.  California tort law would be well served if 
courts avoided the use of the inherent risk concept.  Doing so would 
bring badly needed clarity to the law in this area.  Our goal in this Article 
is to provide this clarity and to rein in the haphazard spread of this new 
no-duty rule to areas such as commercial premises, where the policy 
justifications for the rule are inapplicable.  In Part VII, the conclusion, 
we briefly review the steps the court could take to achieve this goal.  
II. LI V. YELLOW CAB CO., COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, AND 
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK 
The traditional doctrine of assumption of the risk was a formidable 
defense that sheltered negligent defendants from liability to injured 
plaintiffs.  Its focus was on the plaintiff’s knowledge and voluntary 
acceptance of risk.18  The doctrine applied to plaintiffs in a broad range 
of cases including persons injured on amusement park rides, spectators 
at sporting events,19 sports participants,20 and employees injured on the 
job prior to workers’ compensation legislation.21 
However, this doctrine fell on hard times.  Critics objected to the 
consequences of the doctrine: like contributory negligence it leaves 
injured plaintiffs to bear the consequences of defendant negligence.  
Critics also assailed the doctrine as a needless source of confusion and 
complexity in the law and as a doctrine that often led to unfair, harsh—
even draconian—results.22  As a consequence, in 1963, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court abolished the doctrine.23  In its view, the cases in which 
 
 18. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 715 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 19. See, e.g., Brown v. S.F. Baseball Club, 22 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). 
 20. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 700 for a discussion of the traditional application of 
the doctrine of assumption of the risk in these situations. 
 21. See Lamson v. Am. Ax & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900). 
 22. See, e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952). 
 23. See McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240–41 (N.J. 1963) 
(completing the abolition of assumption of the risk by banishing primary assumption of 
the risk as well); see also Meistrich v. Casino Area Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 95–96 
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the doctrine had been employed were, in fact, cases in which the 
defendant was not negligent or in which the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent, and “it was erroneous to suggest to the jury that assumption of 
the risk was still another issue.”24  Experience had shown that “the term 
‘assumption of risk’ is so apt to create mist [rather than aid comprehension] 
that it is better banished from the scene.”25 
California took a different path.  In 1975, the California Supreme 
Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California abolished the doctrine of 
contributory negligence and adopted a system of pure comparative 
negligence.26  The court thereby greatly increased the incidence of 
defendant liability.  After Li, plaintiff negligence no longer completely 
bars recovery in negligence suits; rather, damages are only “diminished 
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering.”27  The court rejected modified comparative negligence—a 
system in which plaintiff fault, if great enough, totally bars recovery—to 
avoid merely shifting “the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence 
rule to a different ground.”28  Li recognized that “fault determinations 
should not completely frustrate the policy of loss distribution.”29 
The court’s express disapproval in Li of doctrines that totally bar 
recovery due to plaintiff’s conduct led to a secondary holding dealing 
with assumption of the risk.  The court had previously exhibited its antagonism 
toward this defense, and Li held that “the defense of assumption of risk 
[is merged] into the general scheme of assessment of liability in 
proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of 
assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory 
negligence.”30  These are cases “where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes 
to encounter a specific known risk imposed by a defendant’s negligence.”31 
Li thus merged cases of unreasonable assumption of the risk into its 
comparative fault regime, leaving open the question of the status of 
reasonable assumption of the risk.  Because of a perception that it would 
 
(N.J. 1959) (subsuming secondary assumption of the risk into the doctrine of contributory 
negligence). 
 24. McGrath, 196 A.2d at 239–40. 
 25. Id. at 240–41. 
 26. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). 
 27. Id. at 1243. 
 28. Id. at 1242 (footnote omitted). 
 29. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 4, at 509. 
 30. Li, 532 P.2d at 1241. 
 31. Id. at 1240. 
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be anomalous to totally bar recovery of reasonable plaintiffs, many 
believed that Li would lead to a complete abolition of the traditional 
defense of assumption of the risk. 
III. KNIGHT V. JEWETT: THE ABOLITION OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK 
AND THE CREATION OF A NEW NO-DUTY REGIME 
A.  The Abolition of Consent-Based Assumption of the Risk 
It was not until the 1992 companion cases of Knight v. Jewett32 and 
Ford v. Gouin33 that the California Supreme Court resolved the question 
left open by Li.  Recasting the issue thought to be left open in Li, now-
Chief Justice George wrote in Knight that “the distinction in assumption 
of risk cases to which the Li court referred . . . was not a distinction 
between instances in which a plaintiff unreasonably encounters a known 
risk . . . and instances in which a plaintiff reasonably encounters such a 
risk.”34  Instead, the distinction was between 
(1) those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal 
conclusion that there is “no duty” on the part of the defendant to protect the 
plaintiff from a particular risk . . . and (2) those instances in which the defendant 
does owe a duty . . . but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury 
caused by the defendant’s breach of that duty . . . .35 
In the first category of cases—the no-duty cases—the plaintiff is barred 
from recovery whether or not he behaved reasonably.  In the second 
category of cases, where the defendant does owe a duty but the plaintiff 
knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant’s breach 
of that duty, the plaintiff may recover but the amount of recovery is 
determined by comparative fault principles. 
At this analytical level, it is fair to say that Knight abolished the 
traditional defense of assumption of the risk, which was precisely how 
Justice Kennard characterized the decision in her dissent.36  To maintain 
continuity with its Li decision, however, the Knight court retained the 
terminology of assumption of the risk.  The court termed the first category 
of cases—the no-duty cases—“primary assumption of risk” cases.37  The 
second category was termed “secondary assumption of risk.”38  Despite 
the retention of this terminology, Justice Kennard’s characterization is 
accurate.  If a plaintiff previously barred by recovery under assumption 
 
 32. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
 33. 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992). 
 34. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 714 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 703. 
 38. Id. 
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of the risk is still to be barred, it will be because the defendant’s conduct 
did not breach a legal duty of care to the plaintiff.  If a defendant breaches a 
duty owed to a plaintiff, the plaintiff will recover an amount determined 
by comparative fault principles. 
Knight, however, created a more complex situation than this analysis 
has so far suggested because, in addition to introducing this new mode of 
analysis, Knight also introduced a new regime of no-duty rules.  It will 
thus be necessary in the future to understand how this no-duty regime 
will be applied. 
B.  The Intentional Injury/Recklessness No-Duty Rule 
1.  The No-Duty Rule and Policy 
Knight involved a touch football game in which one participant was 
injured by the rough play of another.  Although the court in Knight 
abandoned the traditional, consent-based doctrine of assumption of the 
risk, it held that summary judgment for the defendant was proper because 
the defendant did not breach any duty of care owed to the plaintiff.39  In 
reaching this result, the court created a new no-duty rule. 
At its simplest level, Knight created a no-duty rule applicable to 
coparticipants in active sports.  This no-duty rule was policy driven.  In 
its subsequent decision in Kahn v. East Side Union High School District, 
the court explained that “as a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to 
recognize a duty of care when to do so would require that an integral part 
of the sport be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in 
sporting events.”40  Knight “stressed the role of the participant in the 
sport and the likely effect on the sport of imposing liability on such 
persons.”41  In the court’s view, to “impose liability on a coparticipant 
for ‘normal energetic conduct’ while playing—even careless conduct—could 
chill vigorous participation in the sport” and could “alter fundamentally 
the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging 
in activity.”42  Accordingly, the court created a no-duty rule: “[C]oparticipants 
breach a duty of care to each other only if they ‘intentionally injure[] 
 
 39. Id. at 712. 
 40. 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (citations omitted). 
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another player or engage[] in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally 
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”43 
2.  Knight’s Policy Basis Assessed 
The no-duty rule protecting participants in active sports followed from 
the court’s view that to “impose liability on a coparticipant for ‘normal 
energetic conduct’ . . . while playing—even careless conduct—could chill 
vigorous participation in the sport” and could “alter fundamentally the 
nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in 
activity.”44  In the dissent, Justice Kennard questioned whether “the policy 
basis for [the court’s] duty limitation—that the law should permit and 
encourage vigorous athletic competition . . . .”—justified the broad sweep of 
its no-duty rule.45  In her view, a “no-duty rule [might be justified] as 
applied to organized, competitive, contact sports with well-established 
modes of play, [but] it should not be extended to other, more casual 
sports activities, such as the informal ‘mock’ football game . . .” involved in 
Knight itself.46  In such situations, “the policy basis for the duty 
limitation . . . is considerably weakened or entirely absent.”47 
In a similar vein, Stephen Sugarman has written that “there may well 
be good policy reasons generally to prevent lawsuits by professional 
athletes for injuries suffered as part of the game through the fault of 
other participants.”48  These include the presence of existing rulemaking 
bodies, penalty structures, and “reasonably generous injury insurance 
schemes that go well beyond what workers’ compensation would 
provide . . . .”49  Thus, the “social objectives that tort law might serve by 
providing a remedy” may well already be served by alternative 
institutions.50  This, however, is not the case with participants in 
nonprofessional recreational sports.  In Sugarman’s view, the broad no-
duty rule adopted by Knight rests on “a dubious empirical judgment” 
regarding the chilling effect of liability based on normal negligence 
principles.51 
 
 43. Id. at 38–39 (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 711). 
 44. Id. at 38 (citations omitted). 
 45. Knight, 834 P.2d at 723 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 848 
(1997).  Sugarman’s article is the indispensable guide to the modern doctrine of assumption 
of the risk. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as the Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California 
Experience with “New” Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455, 485 (1999). 
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has rejected Knight, concluding that 
“the rules of negligence govern liability for injuries incurred during 
recreational team contact sports.”52  The court found that the “negligence 
standard, properly understood and applied, accomplishes the objectives 
sought by the courts adopting the recklessness standard, objectives with 
which we agree.”53  The objective the court referred to is striking “the 
proper balance between freeing active and vigorous participation in 
recreational team contact sports from the chilling effect of litigation and 
providing a right of redress to an athlete injured through the fault of 
another.”54 
The court found the negligence standard effective because it can adapt 
“to a wide range of situations.  An act or omission that is negligent in 
some circumstances might not be negligent in others.”55  To determine if 
conduct constitutes negligence, the fact finder must weigh 
the sport involved; the rules and regulations governing the sport; the generally 
accepted customs and practices of the sport (including the types of contact and 
the level of violence generally accepted); the risks inherent in the game and 
those that are outside the realm of anticipation; . . . and the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, including the ages and physical attributes 
of the participants, the participants’ respective skills at the game, and the 
participants’ knowledge of the rules and customs.56 
By examining these factors, the negligence standard becomes “sufficiently 
flexible to permit the ‘vigorous competition’” desired.57 
On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court has agreed with 
Knight and cited a concern that may underlie the Knight holding.  It 
wrote that “[o]ne might well conclude that something is terribly wrong 
with a society in which the most commonly-accepted aspects of play—a 
traditional source of a community’s conviviality and cohesion—spur[] 
litigation.”58  In its view, the recklessness standard “recognizes a commonsense 
distinction between excessively harmful conduct and the more routine 
 
 52. Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 29 (Wis. 1993).  In that 
case, a forty-five-year-old plaintiff claimed that he was “slide tackled” by a fifty-seven-
year-old opponent during a soccer game, producing serious injury and violating league 
rules.  Id. 
 53. Id. at 33. 
 54. Id. at 31. 
 55. Id. at 33. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 1994). 
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rough-and-tumble of sports that should occur freely on the playing fields 
and should not be second-guessed in courtrooms.”59 
Whether based on a perhaps dubious policy of not chilling vigorous 
participation or a desire to preclude unseemly litigation over “the most 
commonly-accepted aspects of play—a traditional source of a community’s 
conviviality and cohesion,” the Knight holding represents a rejection of 
the view that juries should be trusted to mediate disputes utilizing the 
“fundamental principle” that liability should be imposed on a defendant 
“for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or 
skill.”60  As such, it is part of a broader trend in California Supreme Court 
decisions of the past two decades limiting the discretion of juries to impose 
liability based on general negligence principles.61  But the question of 
primary concern in this Article is with the specific rules of the Knight 
no-duty regime, their policy bases, and how far this no-duty regime will 
spread beyond the specific no-duty rule adopted in Knight for 
participants in active sports. 
3.  The Rowland Duty Framework and Knight 
Five years after Knight, in Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., the court, 
in an opinion by Chief Justice George, elaborated on the relationship 
between the Knight no-duty rule and the broader duty framework established 
by the court in its landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian.62  Parsons 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1714 (West 2008)). 
 61. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989) (establishing more 
rigorous criteria for plaintiff recovery in negligent infliction of emotional distress 
bystander cases).  Critics of the liability-expanding decisions of the Traynor and Bird 
eras had been critical of negligence decisions that expanded the discretion given juries to 
impose liability based on broad negligence principles.  A paradigm case for these critics 
was Rowland v. Christian’s abandonment of tradition landowner rules in favor of a 
general duty of reasonable care.  Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.  James Henderson, for example, 
wrote in 1976: 
The reforms and changes in the law of negligence in recent years have, 
purportedly to advance identifiable social objectives, eliminated much of the 
specificity with which negligence principles traditionally have been formulated.  
We are rapidly approaching the day when liability will be determined routinely 
on a case by case, “under all the circumstances” basis, with decision makers 
(often juries) guided only by the broadest of general principles.  When that day 
arrives, the retreat from the rule of law will be complete, principled decision 
will have been replaced with decision by whim, and the common law of 
negligence will have degenerated into an unjustifiably inefficient, thinly disguised 
lottery. 
Henderson, Jr., supra note 5, at 468. 
 62. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 561; see Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70,  
82–84 (Cal. 1997). 
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involved a horseback rider thrown from his horse as a consequence of 
the horse having been frightened by noise from the defendant’s garbage 
truck.63  The court identified a traditional no-duty rule limiting the duty 
that operators of machinery owe to horseback riders.  The court in Parsons 
pointed out that this machinery operator no-duty rule should not be 
confused with its Knight no-duty rule.  The court wrote that not every 
case “in which a court concludes that a defendant has not breached a 
duty of care needs to be denominated a ‘primary assumption of risk’ case.  
Instead, ‘primary assumption of risk’ simply describes a subcategory of 
those cases in which the defendant has not breached a duty of care.”64 
Parsons recognized that to assess the viability of the no-duty rule 
applicable to machinery operators—or other no-duty rules—courts should 
engage “in a traditional duty inquiry utilizing the policy considerations 
set out in Rowland v. Christian . . . .”65  In its 1968 landmark Rowland 
decision, the California Supreme Court established the framework for 
analyzing duty issues.  In Rowland, the court wrote of the “fundamental 
principle” that liability should be imposed “for an injury occasioned to 
another by his want of ordinary care or skill.”66  Courts would depart 
from this principle only upon the “balancing of a number of 
considerations,” the major ones of which are 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the 
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved.67 
Thus, in Parsons, the court began with Rowland’s statement that as “a 
general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for 
injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the 
circumstances.’”68  The determination “[w]hether a given case falls within 
an exception to this general rule . . . ‘is a question of law to be determined 
on a case-by-case basis.’”69  This assessment is to be based on the Rowland 
 
 63. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 72–73. 
 64. Id. at 87–88 n.25 (emphasis omitted). 
 65. Id. at 87. 
 66. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 563 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 2008)). 
 67. Id. at 564. 
 68. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 80 (quoting Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564). 
 69. Id. 
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policy considerations, to which the court added “the social value of the 
interest which the actor is seeking to advance.”70  In the court’s view, 
these considerations, on balance, supported the traditional limited 
common law duty regarding machinery operators frightening horses.71 
As the court recognized, the Knight no-duty-for-sports rule is a 
“subcategory of those cases in which the defendant has not breached a 
duty of care.”72  The Knight framework can be seen to truncate the 
Rowland analysis to focus on considerations that are especially relevant 
to sports participants.  The Knight policy of not chilling vigorous 
participation by sports participants to avoid altering fundamentally the 
nature of the sport can be seen to focus on Rowland’s “extent of the 
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing 
a duty to exercise care,” and perhaps the “moral blame attached to the 
defendant’s conduct.”73 
4.  Extensions of Knight’s Intentional Injury/Recklessness                          
No-Duty Rule Beyond Participants? 
Knight raises the question of how courts are to determine when 
careless conduct in other situations will fall within its new no-duty rule.  
Because Knight abolished the traditional consent-based defense of 
assumption of the risk, defendants previously protected from liability by 
that doctrine may now seek shelter under Knight’s new no-duty regime.  
This may be the case in suits against hockey arena owners by spectators 
injured by pucks that fly into the stands.74  Similarly, ski resorts will 
claim to owe no duty when skiers are injured on their slopes.75  And 
amusement parks will do likewise when patrons are harmed by what 
they allege to be the negligent design of “thrill” rides.  In the well known 
Murphy (Flopper) case, for example, Judge Cardozo held that 
assumption of the risk applied to a patron of an amusement park ride in 
his suit against the park owner.76  Such defendants will now seek protections 
under Knight’s no-duty (primary assumption of the risk) rule.  In fact, 
 
 70. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON TORTS 171 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 71. Id. at 84. 
 72. Id. at 88 n.25 (emphasis omitted). 
 73. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564. 
 74. See, e.g., Nemarnik v. L.A. Kings Hockey Club, L.P., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10, 18 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that hockey arena owner owed no duty to eliminate the 
inherent risk of injury to spectators caused by flying pucks). 
 75. See, e.g., Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 395 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006); Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 859 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995). 
 76. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929). 
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Disneyland and Knott’s Berry Farm have done precisely this in litigation 
involving severe injuries occurring on high speed rides such as the 
Indiana Jones attraction.77  These cases might seem a far cry from touch 
football, but such defendants often had avoided the need to litigate 
negligence claims because of the traditional assumption of the risk 
defense.  Knight raises the question of how these and other cases will be 
resolved now.  Fortunately, the Knight court provides a framework for 
developing a new no-duty regime. 
5.  The Knight Framework 
As the Knight court recognized, the question is “how courts are to 
determine when careless conduct of another [falls within the Knight no-
duty rule].”78  The answer to this question is not “dependent on the knowledge 
or consent of the particular plaintiff.”79  Rather, it “turns on whether the 
defendant had a legal duty to avoid such conduct or to protect the 
plaintiff against a particular risk of harm.”80  In the sports context, a 
defendant’s duty “depends heavily on the nature of the sport itself.”81  In 
anticipation of the prospect that its Knight ruling might be argued to 
extend to nonparticipants, the court wrote, “[a]dditionally, the scope of 
the legal duty owed by a defendant frequently will also depend on the 
defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.”82 
Sports injury cases, the court wrote, involve “diverse categories of 
defendants whose alleged misconduct may be at issue . . . .”83  These 
include “owners of sports facilities such as baseball stadiums and ski 
resorts[,] . . . manufacturers and reconditioners of sporting equipment[,] . 
. . sports instructors and coaches[, and] . . . coparticipants . . . .”84  In the 
“sports setting, as elsewhere, the nature of the applicable duty or standard of 
care frequently varies with the role of the defendant whose conduct is at 
issue . . . .”85 
 
 77. See Bolia-Schutt v. Cedar Fair, L.P., No. G033685, 2006 WL 401306, at *3 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2006). 
 78. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992). 
 79. Id. at 709. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 710. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  The focus is on “the nature of the defendants’ activities and the relationship of 
the plaintiffs and the defendants to that activity to decide whether, as a matter of public 
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The same event thus can involve different duties owed by different 
defendants.  To illustrate this point, the court used the example of a 
baseball spectator injured by a thrown bat.  In suits against the player 
who threw the bat and the stadium owner 
two different potential duties [are] at issue—(1) the duty of the ballplayer to 
play the game without carelessly throwing his bat, and (2) the duty of the 
stadium owner to provide a reasonably safe stadium with regard to the relatively 
common (but particularly dangerous) hazard of a thrown bat.  Because each 
defendant’s liability rest[s] on a separate duty, there [would be] no inconsistency in 
the jury verdict absolving the batter of liability but imposing liability on the 
stadium owner for its failure to provide the patron “protection from flying bats, 
at least in the area where the greatest danger exists and where such an 
occurrence is reasonably to be expected.”86 
Thus, the duty of the owner of a ballpark—or a ski resort—would be 
defined “not only by virtue of the nature of the sport itself, but also by 
reference to the steps the sponsoring business entity reasonably should 
be obligated to take in order to minimize the risks without altering the 
nature of the sport.”87 
 C.  The “Inherent Risk” Duty Rules 
As described, the Knight no-duty analysis is straightforward.  In the 
sports context, the focus is on the “nature of the sport itself[,] . . . the 
defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport,” and the policy 
considerations that might justify a no-duty-role.88  Post-Knight duty 
analysis is complicated, however, by the fact that Knight can also be read 
to create a second, separate no-duty rule and also to create new duties of 
care where none had previously existed.  This complexity is a consequence 
of the court’s use of the “inherent risk” concept, which is carried over 
from traditional assumption of the risk cases.89 
In explaining its policy-driven sports participants duty holding, the 
court employed the inherent risk concept.  A long line of cases, including 
the court’s 1968 landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian, had 
established that “[a]s a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care 
to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct 
injures another person.”90  In the sports setting, however, the Knight 
 
policy, the defendants should owe the plaintiffs a duty of care.”  Neighbarger v. Irwin 
Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 354 (Cal. 1994). 
 86. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 
1929). 
 90. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708. 
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court wrote, “defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or 
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself . . . .”91  
Moreover, “[i]n some situations . . . the careless conduct of others is 
treated as an ‘inherent risk’ of a sport, thus barring recovery by the 
plaintiff.”92  For the policy reasons previously discussed, the court held 
that this was the case for sports participants who thus would be liable 
only in cases of intentional injury or conduct so reckless as to be totally 
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.  Although 
the inherent risk concept did no actual work in establishing Knight’s 
sports participants holding, its use by the court suggests that Knight 
established duty rules in addition to the recklessness rule. 
1.  No Duty for Inherent Risks? 
After noting that “[a]s a general rule, persons have a duty to use due 
care to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless 
conduct injures another person,” the court wrote that a property owner, 
for example, “ordinarily is required to use due care to eliminate 
dangerous conditions on his or her property.”93  However, “[i]n the 
sports setting, . . . conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed 
as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself.”94  To illustrate 
this point, the court used the example of moguls on a ski run.  The risks 
posed by moguls are an “inherent risk” of the sport of skiing.  Although 
“moguls on a ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers that might not exist 
were these configurations removed, the challenge and risks posed by the 
moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and a ski resort has no duty to 
eliminate them.”95 
The statement that the resort has no duty to eliminate moguls raises 
the question of what no-duty rule is being invoked by the court.  It is 
possible that the court meant that a ski resort owes a duty not to 
intentionally injure its patrons or engage in conduct so reckless as to be 
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.  
But this seems unlikely.  At the point in the court’s opinion that it 
discussed the mogul example, it had not introduced the intentional 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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injury/recklessness rule.  Moreover, the ski resort is an owner of a sports 
facility—not a participant.  Knight laid out a clear analytic and policy 
framework to be employed to decide whether categories of defendants 
other than participants would be protected by its intentional injury/ 
recklessness rule.  This framework was not utilized by the court in 
reaching its conclusion that a ski resort has no duty to eliminate moguls.  
That no-duty rule came into play because, in the court’s view, the risks 
posed by moguls are an “inherent risk” of the sport of skiing. 
This analysis suggests that Knight established a second no-duty rule 
that is analytically distinct from the sports participant/recklessness rule 
and the framework and policies of that rule.  As stated by Knight, 
“defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a 
plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.”  The only apparent 
criterion for the invocation of this no-duty rule appears to be a court’s 
determination that a risk posed by a defendant is an inherent risk of an 
activity in which the plaintiff is engaged.96  This is a true no-duty rule, 
not a limited-duty rule such as the intentional injury/recklessness rule.  If 
the court finds a risk is inherent, summary judgment is appropriate.  
Moreover, this no-duty rule can be invoked without the usual Rowland 
analysis and the weighing of its policy considerations and without 
utilizing the Knight framework and policies.  Thus the ski resort, a sport 
facility, is protected by this no-duty rule in disregard of Knight’s 
insistence that “the applicable duty . . . varies with the role of the defendant 
whose conduct is in issue.” 
2.  A Duty Not to Increase Risk Over Inherent Risk? 
The court in Knight wrote that although “defendants generally have no 
legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the 
sport itself, it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty 
to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above 
those inherent in the sport.”97  Returning to the ski resort example, the 
court wrote that “although a ski resort has no duty to remove moguls 
from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use due care to maintain its 
towropes in a safe, working condition so as not to expose skiers to an 
 
 96. The court placed its sports participant/recklessness rule within this inherent risk 
analysis.  The court wrote that “[i]n some situations . . . the careless conduct of others is 
treated as an ‘inherent risk’ of a sport, thus barring recovery by the plaintiff.”  Id.  The 
“question [that Knight answers is] how courts are to determine when careless conduct of 
another properly should be considered an ‘inherent risk’ of the sport that (as a matter of 
law) is assumed by the injured participant.”  Id. at 708–09.  The Knight analytic framework 
and policy analysis provided the methodology for answering this question—for determining 
when defendants are protected by Knight’s recklessness rule. 
 97. Id. at 708. 
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increased risk of harm.”98  In the towrope example, the “risk, posed by a 
ski resort’s negligence, clearly is not a risk (inherent in the sport) that is 
assumed by a participant.”99  This analysis suggests that a broad general 
duty might exist for persons who would otherwise not owe a duty of care 
and who have no relationship to a sports participant or to a sporting 
activity “to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and 
above those inherent in the sport.”100 
IV. EXTENSIONS OF KNIGHT’S INTENTIONAL INJURY/                    
RECKLESSNESS RULE 
A.  Extension of the Intentional Injury/Recklessness Rule to Golf 
In Knight the court expressly left open the question whether a limited 
duty of care comparable to its Knight no-duty rule should be applied to 
“less active sports, such as archery or golf.”101  In 2007 the court in Shin v. 
Ahn answered this question, holding that “the primary assumption of risk 
doctrine does apply to golf and that being struck by a carelessly hit ball 
is an inherent risk of the sport.”102  Thus “golfers have a limited duty of 
care to other players, breached only if they intentionally injure them or 
engage in conduct that is ‘so reckless as to be totally outside the range of 
the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’”103  The court found court of 
appeal decisions that had previously reached this conclusion convincing.  
One of these, Dilger v. Moyles, had found Knight’s policies applicable to golf: 
   While golf may not be as physically demanding as . . . basketball or football, 
risk is nonetheless inherent in the sport.  Hitting a golf ball at a high rate of 
speed involves the very real possibility that the ball will take flight in an 
unintended direction. . . . 
   Holding participants liable for missed hits would only encourage lawsuits and 
deter players from enjoying the sport. . . . Social policy dictates that the law 
should not discourage participation in such an activity whose benefits to the 
individual player and to the community at large are so great.104 
The court in Shin agreed with this conclusion. 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 711 n.7. 
 102. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 583 (Cal. 2007). 
 103. Id. at 590. 
 104. Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
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B.  Extension to Some Intentional Torts 
In 2006 the court expanded the protection of the Knight rule to cover 
what would otherwise be an intentional tort by a participant.105  In Avila 
v. Citrus Community College District, it held that a community college 
whose baseball team is engaged in intercollegiate competition owes “no 
duty to [an opposing batter at the plate] to prevent [its] pitcher from 
hitting batters, even intentionally.”106  The court wrote that “in the 
sporting context, [primary assumption of the risk] precludes liability for 
injuries arising from those risks deemed inherent in a sport . . . .”107  
Knight, it will be recalled, had held that a participant’s careless conduct 
is to be treated as an inherent risk of a sport, precluding liability for such 
conduct.  In contrast, a breach of a legal duty of care would exist in two 
types of situations: (1) if the participant “intentionally injures another 
player”; or (2) if the participant “engages in conduct that is so reckless as 
to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the 
sport.”108  In Avila the court conflated these two categories: “an athlete 
does not assume the risk of a coparticipant’s intentional or reckless 
conduct ‘totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the 
sport.’”109  Having made this move, the court ruled that “even if the . . . 
pitcher intentionally threw at [the plaintiff], his conduct did not fall 
outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.”110  It thus 
held that the plaintiff’s action was barred by primary assumption of the 
risk.  Avila, therefore, can be seen to convert Knight’s two prong inquiry 
into a single inquiry: whether conduct—intentional or reckless—is 
“totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.” 
Avila, however, is best read as a holding limited to the well-entrenched 
practice of pitchers occasionally throwing at batters.  This reading 
of Avila is certainly consistent with the court’s treatment of the 
recklessness/intentional injury rule in its other decisions111 and with the 
court’s discussion in Avila of the well-established practice of pitchers 
occasionally throwing at batters.  After surveying a variety of authorities, 
the court took judicial notice of the fact that, despite official disapproval, 
“pitchers have been throwing at batters for the better part of baseball’s 
century-plus history.”112  It noted that pitchers “intentionally throw at 
 
 105. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006). 
 106. Id. at 394. 
 107. Id. at 391. 
 108. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711. 
 109. Avila, 131 P.3d at 394. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007); Kahn v. E. Side Union High 
Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003). 
 112. Avila, 131 P.3d at 394 n.12. 
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batters to disrupt a batter’s timing or back him away from home plate, to 
retaliate after a teammate has been hit, or to punish a batter for having 
hit a home run.”113  Indeed, the practice is “so accepted by custom that a 
pitch intentionally thrown at a batter has its own terminology: ‘brushback,’ 
‘beanball,’ ‘chin music.’”114  Based on these considerations, the court 
concluded that “[f]or better or worse, being intentionally thrown at is a 
fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport of baseball.  It is not the 
function of tort law to police such conduct.”115  Under this reading, Avila 
simply creates an exception, specific to baseball, to Knight’s general rule 
that participants owe a duty not to intentionally injure other participants. 
C.  Categories of Defendants 
1.  Coaches and Sports Instructors: Kahn v. East Side                                    
Union High School District 
In 2003 the court in Kahn extended Knight’s no-duty/recklessness rule 
to coaches and sports instructors.  At the same time, it created confusion 
regarding future applications of this no-duty rule. 
In Kahn the court reaffirmed Knight’s analytic and policy framework 
and extended its intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule to coaches.116  
In an opinion for the court, Chief Justice George wrote that “the question 
of duty depends not only on the nature of the sport, but also on the ‘role 
of the defendant whose conduct is at issue . . . .’”117  Crucial to the 
Knight holding was the “role of the participant in the sport and the likely 
effect on the sport of imposing liability on such persons.”118  As a 
“matter of policy”—to not “discourage vigorous participation”—the Knight 
court had adopted a no-duty rule to be applied to protect participants in 
active sports.119 
In Kahn the court again pointed to the different roles played by 
different defendants, “including owners of sports facilities, manufacturers of 
sports equipment, and coaches and instructors.”120  Indeed, “[d]uties with 
respect to the same risk may vary according to the role played by 
 
 113. Id. at 393. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 394. 
 116. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 30. 
 117. Id. at 38. 
 118. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 39. 
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particular defendants involved in the sport.”121  The court again used the 
thrown baseball bat example.  The “batter would not have a duty to 
avoid carelessly throwing the bat after getting a hit . . . .”122  The fear is 
that a full duty of care might chill “vigorous deployment of a bat in the 
course of the game . . . .”  In contrast, “a stadium owner . . . may have a 
duty to take reasonable measures to protect spectators from carelessly 
thrown bats.”123  In the cases of the stadium owner, “reasonable steps 
may minimize the risk without altering the nature of the sport.”124 
When the court in Kahn turned to the question of whether Knight’s no-
duty rule should be extended to a new category of defendants—
coaches—it concluded that although the coach’s role is different from a 
participant, an analogous policy was involved: the policy of not having a 
“chilling effect on the enterprise of teaching [by challenging a student] 
and learning skills that are necessary to the sport.  At a competitive level, 
especially, this chilling effect is undesirable.”125  The court wrote that 
“[t]o impose a duty to mitigate the inherent risks of learning a sport by 
refraining from challenging a student . . . could have a chilling effect on 
the enterprise of teaching and learning skills that are necessary to the 
sport.”126  In the sports setting the “object to be served by the doctrine of 
primary assumption of risk . . . is to avoid recognizing a duty of care 
when to do so would tend to alter the nature of an active sport or chill 
vigorous participation in the activity.”127  Since this “concern applies to 
the process of learning to become competent or competitive in such a 
sport,” the “standard set forth in Knight . . . as it applies to coparticipants, 
generally should apply to sports instructors . . . .”128  Thus a plaintiff 
must allege and prove that “the instructor acted with intent to cause a 
student’s injury or that the instructor acted recklessly in the sense that 
the instructor’s conduct was ‘totally outside the range of the ordinary 
activity’ . . . in teaching or coaching the sport.”129 
 
 121. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 40. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 43. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992)). 
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2.  Kahn’s Policy Assessed 
Despite the similarities between participants and coaches or sports 
instructors, the Knight policies become more attenuated in the latter 
situation.  Justice Kennard in a dissenting opinion and Justice Werdegar 
in a concurring opinion pointed to significant differences in the two 
situations.  Justice Kennard criticized the majority for its failure to recognize 
“the significant difference between the two groups.”130  Although “[p]ersons 
participating in active sports have to expect that a coparticipant may play 
too roughly[,] . . . coaches of student athletes teach them the skills 
necessary to perform their sport of choice safely and effectively.”131 
Looking back on his experience on a high school baseball team, a New 
York Times writer has recounted how the coach holds an almost god-like 
position for a young inexperienced athlete.132  The student will do almost 
anything the coach asks without question.  In this vein, Justice Kennard 
noted that “[b]ecause student athletes, particularly minors, often consider 
their coach a mentor or role model, they trust the coach not to carelessly 
and needlessly expose them to injury.”133  In her view, “[t]he majority’s 
decision puts an end to that trust.”134  Rather than affirming that societal 
expectation and imposing a corresponding legal duty, the “standard the 
majority imposes is dangerously lax; it puts concern for the physical 
safety of children far down on a secondary school coach’s list of priorities.”135  
In contrast, the negligence standard “would leave coaches free to 
challenge or push their students to advance their skills level as long as 
they do so without exposing the student athletes to an unreasonable risk 
of harm.”136 
In a similar vein, Justice Werdegar wrote that unlike a competitor, “a 
coach . . . stands somewhat apart from the fray, . . . observing and directing 
the competition, . . . keep[ing] a cooler head than the competitors.”137  
 
 130. Id. at 52 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see also id. at 49 (Wedegar, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the court should recognize a greater duty on the part of instructors than 
participants owe to each other). 
 131. Id. at 52 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 132. Michael Lewis, Coach Fitz’s Management Theory, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 
28, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 42. 
 133. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 52 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 49 (Wedegar, J., concurring). 
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As such, a coach is uniquely situated to anticipate potential problems and 
protect students from unnecessary harm.  “Society expects . . . more from 
. . . coaches than merely that they will refrain from harming a student 
intentionally or with wanton disregard for safety.”138  Although school 
sports “are certainly valuable, . . . they are not more important than, for 
example, emergency cardiac care . . . and . . . require no greater immunity 
than the law grants such highly useful activities.139 
3.  Owners of Sports Facilities and Manufacturers of                                   
Sporting Equipment? 
If an extension of no-duty rules to manufacturers of sports equipment 
or owners of sports facilities were to be proposed, the Knight/Kahn 
framework counsels that a court should first examine the category of 
defendant seeking the protection of a no-duty rule and the role played by 
that defendant.  Then it should examine the policies applicable to the 
category and role.  And in doing this, it should acknowledge the 
different role and policies applicable to commercial enterprises, such as 
manufacturers or sports facility owners, as opposed to individual sports 
participants and coaches or instructors. 
Sports participants and coaches make individual—often split-
second—choices.  Knight and Kahn were concerned that liability for 
ordinary negligence might have a chilling effect on vigorous participation or 
teaching and learning skills necessary to a sport.  This concern gives 
special prominence to the Rowland policy consideration of the “extent of 
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care” and perhaps to the “moral blame 
attached to the defendant’s conduct.”140 
In contrast, manufacturers and owners of sports facilities make conscious 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 50.  While the court expanded the reach of Knight’s inherent injury/recklessness 
rule, it may also have adopted a relaxed definition of recklessness.  In sending the case 
back to the court to determine whether or not the coach was reckless, the court implies 
that the standard for recklessness in primary assumption of risk cases may become closer 
to negligence.  In Justice Wedegar’s concurring opinion, she points out that while the 
majority applies a recklessness standard, she does not understand that standard to be 
equivalent to recklessness as it is sometimes understood, i.e., as the “willful or 
wanton misconduct” shown when an actor has “intentionally done an act of an 
unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that 
he must be taken to have been aware of it . . . .”  Id. at 48 (quoting WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971)). 
Justice Kennard seems to agree with Justice Wedegar in this assessment, as, in her view, 
the allegations in Kahn state “a cause of action for negligence, not recklessness.”  Id. at 
53 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 140. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
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design—and, in the case of sports facilities owners, maintenance— 
decisions affecting the safety of the many who, over time, use their 
products or facilities.  With respect to these commercial enterprises, other 
Rowland considerations and policies assume greater prominence.  Of 
particular significance in the case of these commercial enterprise defendants 
are “the policy of preventing future harm” and “the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”141  These commercial 
enterprises are more responsive than individual actors to the safety 
incentives created by liability rules,142 and negligence liability—as well 
as strict liability in the case of manufacturers—is thought to be desirable 
precisely because of its potential to create incentives for safety.143  Also, 
these commercial entities will treat liability costs as part of their overall 
business costs, eventually reflected in the prices charged for their 
products and services and thus distributed to the public.144  A full duty of 
reasonable care in these circumstances thus will have the desirable effect 
of preventing future harm and distributing the burden of accident costs. 
The Vermont Supreme Court reflected this perspective when it refused 
to relieve a ski resort of a duty of due care in the case of a skier who 
collided with a ski maze whose location and design were alleged to pose 
an unreasonable risk of harm to skiers.145  The court wrote that the 
“major public policy implications [were] those underlying the law of 
premises liability.”146  It explained: 
The policy rationale is to place responsibility for maintenance of the land on 
those who own or control it, with the ultimate goal of keeping accidents to the 
minimum level possible.  Defendants, not recreational skiers, have the expertise 
and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence 
of their agents and employees.  They alone can properly maintain and inspect 
their premises, and train their employees in risk management.  They alone can 
insure against risks and effectively spread the cost of insurance among their 
thousands of customers.  Skiers, on the other hand, are not in a position to 
discover and correct risks of harm, and they cannot insure against the ski area’s 
negligence.147 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Sugarman, supra note 48, at 867; Ursin, Business Premises, supra note 5, 
at 829. 
 143. Ursin, Business Premises, supra note 5, at 829. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 796 (Vt. 1995) (holding a release from 
negligence liability void). 
 146. Id. at 799. 
 147. Id. 
URSIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 9/4/2008  11:30:47 AM 
 
408 
The Vermont Supreme Court thus refused to relieve the sport facility 
owner of a duty of reasonable care toward its patrons, holding a release 
to be invalid.148 
The California Supreme Court’s analysis in both Knight and Kahn 
points to a similar conclusion.  In both cases, the court pointed to the 
different roles played by different defendants, “including owners of 
sports facilities, manufacturers of sports equipment, and coaches and 
instructors.”149  Indeed, “[d]uties with respect to the same risk may vary 
according to the role played by particular defendants involved in the 
sport.”150  And in each case, the court drew a distinction between the 
duties owed by individual baseball players and stadium owners by using 
the example of a thrown bat. 
The “batter would not have a duty to avoid carelessly throwing the bat 
after getting a hit . . . .”151  The fear is that a full duty of care might chill 
“vigorous deployment of a bat in the course of a game.”152  In contrast, 
“a stadium owner . . . may have a duty to take reasonable measures to 
protect spectators from carelessly thrown bats.”  In the case of the 
stadium owner, “reasonable steps may minimize the risk without altering 
the nature of the sport.”153  The clear implication is that the court contemplated 
that owners of sport facilities, and presumably manufacturers of sports 
equipment, would be held to a standard of reasonable care. 
This implication is supported by the law and policy developed by the 
court in commercial premises cases.  For example, in Ortega v. K-Mart 
Corp.,154 the court developed an aggressive negligence rule—some have 
argued approaching strict liability—to be applied to store owners in slip 
and fall cases.155  The court in Ortega pointed to the “important policy 
that places a premium on maintenance, a crucial factor in the storekeeper’s 
duty to take [safety] precautions.”156 
Manufacturers also play a very different role than either players or 
coaches, and the law and policy developed by the court in the area of 
products liability reflects this.  California products liability cases have 
long recognized that “public policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
 
 148. Id. at 800. 
 149. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 39 (Cal. 2003). 
 150. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  See also Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 709 (Cal. 1992). 
 153. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 38. 
 154. 36 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2001). 
 155. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of 
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 651–52 (1992); Steven D. Winegar, 
Comment, Reapportioning the Burden of Uncertainty: Storekeeper Liability in the Self-
Service Slip-and-Fall Case, 41 UCLA L. REV. 861, 893–94 (1994). 
 156. Ortega, 36 P.3d at 19. 
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wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and 
health . . . .”157  In Soule v. General Motors Corp.,158 for example, the 
court reaffirmed the basic framework of its landmark 1978 decision in 
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,159 which had established a two-prong 
test for design defects, and refused to return products to a pure 
negligence theory.160  It would be startling, indeed, if a court were to rule 
that manufacturers of sporting equipment do not even owe a full duty of 
reasonable care.161  Not surprisingly, courts of appeal early on recognized 
that Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness rule does not apply to 
products liability claims against manufacturers, and they reached an 
 
 157. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
 158. 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994). 
 159. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
 160. Soule, 882 P.2d at 308. 
 161. Of course, manufacturers and owners of sports facilities may once again trot 
out the “policy argument that [imposing negligence liability] would lead to the demise or 
substantially diminished availability of recreational services and programs.”  See City of 
Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 161 P.3d 1095, 1112 (Cal. 2007).  This would not be a 
fact-based policy argument; it would be pure conjecture, unsupported by empirical 
evidence.  And the court rejected this type of argument in recent decisions involving 
high-speed amusement park rides and recreational services and programs.  See Gomez v. 
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 51 (Cal. 2005); City of Santa Barbara, 161 P.3d 1095.  In 
City of Santa Barbara, for example, the court held, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
George, that “public policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement . . . 
purporting to release [a defendant from] liability for future gross negligence . . . .”  Id. at 
1115.  The court also indicated an increasing impatience with this type of conjectural 
argument.  The Chief Justice wrote: 
[I]f the premise of defendants and their amici curiae were correct—that is, if 
failing to enforce [such] agreements . . . would imperil the very existence of 
sports and recreational industries—we at least would expect to see some 
analogous evidence in the experience of those states that prohibit even 
agreements releasing liability for future ordinary negligence. 
Id. at 1110. 
The court “brought [seven such states] to the parties’ attention and solicited supplemental 
briefing concerning the defendants’ policy argument . . . .”  Id. at 1112.  It reported that 
the defendants “concede[d] in their supplemental briefs that they found no empirical 
support” for the claim that prohibiting agreements releasing defendants from negligence 
liability “would lead to the demise or substantially diminished availability of recreational 
services and programs.”  Id.  In the court’s view, the “circumstance that neither 
defendants nor their supporting amici curiae have found from the experience of our sister 
states any substantial empirical evidence supporting their dire predictions is . . . both 
relevant and telling.”  Id. at 1113. 
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analogous conclusion with respect to claims against owners of sports 
facilities.162 
In light of this analysis, it may appear anomalous that among the court 
of appeal cases the court relied on in Shin to extend Knight’s recklessness 
rule to golf participants was American Golf Corp. v. Superior Court—a 
case in which the defendant was the golf course, the owner of a sport 
facility.  Like Shin itself, the court of appeal in American Golf had relied 
on the earlier Diliger decision, which had applied Knight’s recklessness 
rule to golfers.163  In American Golf, a golfer’s shot ricocheted off a 
wooden yard marker and injured his companion.  The companion sued 
the golf course for negligent design and placement of the markers.164  
Relying on Diliger, the American Golf court applied the primary 
assumption of the risk doctrine and directed the trial court to grant the 
golf course’s motion for summary judgment.165 
In Shin the California Supreme Court quoted American Golf’s holding 
that “golf is an active sport, errant shots are an inherent risk of golf, 
yardage markers are an integral part of the sport, and the golf course as 
recreation provider did not increase the risk of injury by its design and 
placement of the yardage marker.”166 
American Golf’s holding—and the Shin court’s apparent approval of 
this holding—suggest that owners of sports facilities, like golf courses, 
may only owe sports participants a duty not to intentionally injure them 
or engage in conduct totally outside the range of the ordinary activity 
involved in the sport.  On the other hand, both Knight and Kahn make 
clear that before the Knight no-duty rule is extended to owners of sports 
 
 162. Thus, in 1993 in Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court, the court 
concluded that it could “find nothing in the nature of . . .  manufacturing . . . to indicate 
that a finding of no duty on the manufacturer’s part should be made.”  19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
24, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. was not a sports case, but 
subsequent decisions involving sports equipment have reached a similar conclusion.  For 
example, in a products liability action based on a claim of inadequate warning of danger 
against the manufacturer of an above ground swimming pool, the court in Bunch v. 
Hoffinger Industries, Inc. held that “assumption of risk does not insulate equipment 
suppliers from liability for injury from providing defective equipment.”  20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
780, 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).  More recently, in 2006, the court of appeal in Ford v. 
Polaris Industries, Inc. reached the same conclusion with respect to design defects in a 
case involving a jet ski.  43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
In Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., decided in 1995, the court distinguished the duty 
owed by co-participant golfers from that owed by owners and operators of golf courses, 
holding that the latter “owed a duty of care to [golfers] in the design and maintenance 
of . . . golf course[s].”  40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); see Dilger v. 
Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 163. See Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 588 (Cal. 2007); Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 164. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686–87. 
 165. Id. at 690. 
 166. Shin, 165 P.3d at 587 (quoting Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685). 
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facilities, a court should examine “not only . . . the nature of the sport, 
but also . . . the ‘role of the defendant whose conduct is at issue. . . .’”167  
And this examination should include an inquiry as to whether the Knight 
policies apply.  The court of appeal in American Golf did not engage in 
such an examination, nor did the California Supreme Court do so in its 
discussion of American Golf. 
In fact, American Golf is better read as applying Knight’s second no-
duty rule: the no-duty-for-inherent-risk rule.  American Golf illustrates 
that this second no-duty rule can be applied to protect owners of sports 
facilities without the need to consider Knight’s framework and policies.  
The golf course and its yardage markers are equivalent to the ski resort 
and moguls. 
V.  THE “INHERENT RISK” DUTY RULES 
The inherent risk no-duty rule, it will be recalled, originated with 
Knight’s discussion of the duties owed by a ski resort to its patrons.  
Contrasting moguls on a slope with negligently maintained towropes, the 
court wrote that although a ski resort has “no legal duty to eliminate (or 
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, [such as 
moguls on a slope,] it is well established that defendants generally do 
have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over 
and above those inherent in the sport[, for example, with unsafe 
towropes].”168  This discussion suggested two duty rules in addition to 
the intentional injury/recklessness rule: (1) a no-duty-for inherent risk 
rule; and (2) a duty, where one might not otherwise exist, to use due care 
not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in 
the sport.  In contrast to the intentional injury/recklessness rule, whose 
framework was carefully laid out in Knight and subsequent cases, the 
inherent risk duty rules are fraught with confusion and problematic in 
their applications.  Before discussing these rules in detail, however, we 
examine a court of appeal decision that shaped the development of these 
rules. 
 
 167. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003). 
 168. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992). 
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A. The No-Duty For Inherent Risk Rule: An Early Application 
Three years after the Knight decision, a court of appeal held that a ski 
resort owed no duty to a skier who collided with one of its ski towers.169  
Since a ski resort is a sports facility, one might have thought that the 
court would apply the Knight framework and ask whether the policy of 
chilling vigorous participation applies to such a defendant.  That analysis, 
called for when a court is deciding whether Knight’s intentional injury/ 
recklessness rule applies to a category of defendants, was not made.  
Instead, the court applied Knight’s second no-duty rule: the inherent risk 
no-duty rule, thus illustrating how this second no-duty rule can be 
applied without regard to the Knight framework—or the duty analysis 
called for by Rowland v. Christian. 
Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area involved Mammoth 
Mountain Ski Resort’s claim that it owed no duty to protect its patrons 
from injuries caused by collisions with inadequately padded ski towers.170  
The plaintiff in Connelly was injured when he lost control and collided 
with a ski lift tower while skiing at defendant’s ski resort.  The plaintiff 
claimed that defendant had been negligent in not properly padding the 
metal tower so as to cushion the blow and prevent his injuries.171  The 
court of appeal upheld the trial court’s summary judgment for the 
defendant.172  Relying in part on pre-Knight assumption of the risk cases, 
the court reasoned that “primary assumption of risk arises where a 
plaintiff voluntarily participates in an activity or sport involving certain 
inherent risks . . . .”173  The court wrote that the plaintiff “collided with 
a ski lift tower while skiing.  This risk . . . is inherent in the sport.  
Consequently . . . Mammoth, under the doctrine of primary assumption 
of risk, owed no duty to protect [the plaintiff] against this inherent 
risk.”174 
The plaintiff in Connelly also had argued that Mammoth breached “a 
different duty, the duty not to increase the inherent risks of skiing . . . by 
failing to maintain adequate padding on the lift towers at snow level.”175  
The court, however, found no authority requiring ski area operators to 
pad lift towers.  It would be anomalous, in the court’s view, “to hold an 
 
 169. Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 856 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 857. 
 172. Id. at 859. 
 173. Id. at 857. 
 174. Id. at 858. 
 175. Id. 
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operator who padded its towers . . . more liable than an operator who 
failed to do so.”176  The court found “no evidence . . . that Mammoth 
increased the inherent risk of colliding with a ski lift tower while 
skiing.”177  The Connelly court held that a skier “colliding with a ski lift 
tower while skiing is an inherent risk within the doctrine of primary 
assumption of risk, and [thus the ski resort] owed no duty to [the injured 
skier] to protect him from this inherent risk.”178  The plaintiff in 
Connelly could not “establish the duty element of his negligence and 
negligence-based premises liability causes of action” and thus summary 
judgment was appropriate.179 
B.  Knight as Duty-Creating? 
1.  Rejection of Knight as Creating a Broad                                                  
New Duty of Due Care 
In Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., the court in 1997 attempted to 
clarify its Knight ruling.180  In Parsons, the plaintiff was injured when 
thrown from his horse which had been frightened by noise from the 
defendant’s nearby garbage truck.  The court of appeal had concluded 
that, based on Knight, the defendant had a common law duty to avoid 
increasing the risk of harm to the plaintiff over and above the inherent 
risk in the activity of recreational horseback riding.181  The California 
Supreme Court rejected this view.182 
The court found that a traditional no-duty, or “limited duty,” rule applied.  
Specifically, courts had long “recognized that a defendant breaches no 
duty of care merely by operating socially beneficial machinery in a 
manner that is regular and necessary, even if such ordinary operation 
happens to frighten a nearby horse and, as a result of the horse’s 
reaction, some injury or damage ensues.183  Although the defendant 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 859. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1997). 
 181. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 182. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 72. 
 183. Id. 
URSIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 9/4/2008  11:30:47 AM 
 
414 
had a duty to conduct its garbage collection activity in a prudent fashion (and to 
use due care to avoid making unusual noises unnecessary to accomplish its 
task), it had no duty to avoid making the regular noises that were a normal 
incident to its operations merely because of the possibility that these ordinary 
operations might happen to frighten a horse that was in the vicinity of its 
truck.184 
The plaintiff in Parsons argued that Knight was what might be called a 
“duty creating” decision and thus, under Knight, a duty of due care was 
owed to the horseback rider.  It will be recalled that the court in Knight 
had written that “[a]lthough defendants generally have no legal duty to 
eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, . . . 
defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the 
risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport.”185  
This statement could be read as creating new duties of due care where 
none had previously existed.  The court in Parsons sought to correct this 
impression. 
The court made clear that Knight did not create a broad new general 
duty of due care where none had previously existed.  This should be no 
surprise since Knight created a new no-duty regime.  The Parsons court 
rejected the “proposition that defendants generally owe a duty not to 
increase the risk inherent in whatever activity plaintiffs happen to be 
pursuing, regardless of the lack of relationship between defendant and 
plaintiff.”186  Thus, in this case “in which defendant had no participatory 
involvement in the activity undertaken by plaintiff, the decision in 
Knight does not define whatever duty was owed by defendant to 
plaintiff.”187 
2.  Knight as Duty-Creating in Organized Relationship Cases 
Although the court in Parsons emphasized that Knight did not create a 
broad new general duty of care where a duty of care had not previously 
existed, its opinion nevertheless suggests that Knight is a duty-creating 
decision for a limited group of defendants.  The court wrote that the 
Knight statement that defendants generally owe a duty not to increase the 
risk inherent in a sporting activity “was made in the context of our 
discussion of the duty owed by parties who have some organized 
relationship with each other and to a sporting activity—in our example, 
that of ski resort and ski patron.”188 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992) (emphasis added). 
 186. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 84. 
 187. Id. at 72. 
 188. Id. at 86. 
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The court then noted that court of appeal cases decided since Knight 
illustrated that “there are circumstances in which the relationship 
between defendant and plaintiff gives rise to a duty on the part of the 
defendant to use due care not to increase the risks inherent in the 
plaintiff’s activity.”189  Citing Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area190 
as an example, the court wrote that “a purveyor of recreational activities 
owes a duty to a patron not to increase the risks inherent in the activity in 
which the patron has paid to engage.”191  “Likewise,” the court continued, 
“a coach or sport instructor owes a duty to a student not to increase the 
risks inherent in the learning process undertaken by the student.”192  In 
contrast were cases, such as Parsons itself, in which the “parties have no 
such (or similar) relationship—and instead are independent actors, 
separately pursuing their own activities.”193  In these cases, “a defendant 
generally has no duty to avoid increasingly the risks inherent in a 
plaintiff’s activity.”194 
It might seem, therefore, that the court in Parsons viewed Knight as 
both creating a new no-duty rule for sports participants and establishing 
a category of sports-related cases in which defendants have a “duty to 
use due care not to increase the risk inherent in the plaintiff’s activity.”  
This category includes purveyors of recreational activities and coaches 
or instructors.  These are “parties who have some organized relationship 
with each other and to a sporting activity—in our example, that of ski 
resort and ski patron.”195 
 
 189. Id. at 86–87. 
 190. Id. at 87 (citing Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 86.  Similarly, the court in Avila v. Citrus Community College District, 
131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006) treated Knight as a duty-creating decision.  With respect to 
Knight’s duty-creating aspect, the court wrote: 
We have previously established that coparticipants have a duty not to act 
recklessly, outside the bounds of the sport, and coaches and instructors have a 
duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports participation; we also have 
noted in dicta that those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities have a 
similar duty not to increase the inherent risks, albeit in the context of businesses 
selling recreational opportunities.  In contrast, those with no relation to the 
sport have no such duty.   
Id. at 392 (citations omitted). 
Turning to the duty owed by a college hosting an intercollegiate baseball game, the 
court wrote that “the host school’s role is a mixed one: its players are coparticipants, its 
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3.  An Unnecessary Source of Confusion 
Knight was not needed, however, to establish a duty of due care.  As 
the Parsons court recognized, Rowland had long ago established that 
“[a]s a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is 
liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in 
the circumstances . . . .’”196  Thus coaches, purveyors of recreational 
activities, and school districts would owe a duty to use due care not to 
increase the risk inherent in the plaintiff’s activity unless for reasons of 
policy a court were to include—as it did in Parsons with respect to 
machine operators—that no such duty was owed. 
Not only was Knight unnecessary to establish a duty of due care, but 
to use it to do so injects confusion into the court’s analysis.  In Kahn the 
court quoted Parsons, writing “that ‘there are circumstances in which the 
relationship between defendant and plaintiff gives rise to a duty on the 
part of the defendant to use due care not to increase the risks inherent in 
the plaintiff’s activity.’”197  For example, “a purveyor of recreational 
activities owes a duty to a patron not to increase the risks inherent in the 
activity in which the patron has paid to engage.  Likewise, a coach or 
sport instructor owes a duty to a student not to increase the risks inherent 
in the learning process undertaken by the student.”198 
One might have thought, based on this statement, that purveyors of 
recreational activities and coaches or sports instructors owe participants 
the same duty of care and that this duty is to use due care to avoid 
injuring them.  However, as we have seen, the Kahn court held as a matter 
of policy that the protection of Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness 
rule extends to coaches.  Carelessness, in the case of coaches, is considered 
an inherent risk of the sport. 
So it turns out that a seemingly straightforward statement that a 
defendant has “a duty . . . to use due care not to increase the risks inherent in 
the plaintiff’s activity” means, in the case of a coach, a duty to use due 
 
coaches and managers have supervisorial authority over the conduct of the game, and 
other representatives of the school are responsible for the condition of the playing 
facility.”  Id.  With regard to Knight as a duty-creating decision, the court found that the 
District was “not a disinterested, uninvolved party vis-à-vis the athletes it invites to 
compete on its grounds.”  Id.  The court thus disagreed with the argument that “the 
District is little more than a passive provider of facilities and therefore should have no 
obligation to visiting players.”  Id.  Instead, the court held that “in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate competition, the host school and its agents owe a duty to home and 
visiting players alike to, at a minimum, not increase the risks inherent in the sport.”  Id. 
 196. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 80 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 
1968)). 
 197. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 39 (Cal. 2003) (quoting 
Parsons, 936 P.2d at 86–87). 
 198. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 87 (citations omitted). 
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care not to act “with intent to cause a student’s injury or . . . [act] 
recklessly in the sense that the instructor’s conduct was ‘totally outside 
the range of the ordinary activity’ . . . in teaching or coaching the sport.”199  
In other words, the “duty of due care” does not include a duty of due care. 
In fact, the statement that a defendant owes a duty not to increase the 
risks inherent in a sporting activity is meaningless.  In translation, it amounts 
to the statement that coaches and those responsible for maintaining 
athletic facilities have a “similar” duty not to increase the inherent risks, 
but their duties may not be similar.  A statement that a defendant owes “a 
duty not to increase the inherent risk” really means that a defendant owes 
“some unspecified duty.”  This is because “inherent risk” is an empty vessel: 
as to some defendants, carelessness is an inherent risk; for others, it may 
not be. 
A more serious problem lurks behind this semantic confusion.  If “a 
purveyor of recreational activities” and “[l]ikewise a coach . . . [owe] a 
duty not to increase the risks inherent [in an activity]” and coaches owe 
only a duty to refrain from intentionally or recklessly injuring, it might 
be inferred that purveyors of recreational activities “likewise” only owe 
this limited duty.200  However, Kahn, by retaining and reemphasizing the 
Knight framework, suggests that the extension of this no-duty rule to 
another category of defendants such as purveyors of recreational activities 
would only occur after the court’s examination of whether the Knight 
policy of not chilling vigorous participation applied.  The possibility 
remains, however, that Knight’s second no-duty rule—the no-duty-for-
inherent-risk rule—might apply, illustrating once again the possibility 
that this rule might bypass the duty analysis required by Knight and 
Rowland and trump long-established premises liability policies. 
 
 199. Kahn, 75 P.3d. at 43. 
 200. The court’s 2006 Avila decision is illustrative.  The court wrote that Knight 
“established that coparticipants have a duty not to act recklessly, outside the bounds of 
the sport . . . .”  Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006).  Next, 
the court wrote that “coaches and instructors have a duty not to increase the risks 
inherent in sports participation [and] . . . those responsible for maintaining athletic 
facilities have a similar duty not to increase the inherent risks, albeit in the context of 
businesses selling recreational opportunities.”  Id.  Since coaches and instructors, 
according to Kahn, are protected by the same limited duty—not to intentionally or 
recklessly injure—as participants, and those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities 
have “a similar duty,” Avila could be read to suggest that those maintaining athletic 
facilities or those who sell recreational activities owe only the limited duty not to 
intentionally injure or engage in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the 
range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. 
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C.  The Inherent Risk No-Duty Rule: Endorsement and Application 
As will be recalled, the inherent risk no-duty rule originated with 
Knight’s mogul example.  In Parsons the court wrote, quoting Knight, 
that “‘[a]lthough defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or 
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well 
established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not 
to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the 
sport.’”201  Thus, the court continued, “‘although a ski resort has no duty 
to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use due 
care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition.’”202 
In addition, the court in Parsons cited Connelly approvingly as illustrating 
that “a purveyor of recreational activities owes a duty to a patron not to 
increase the risks inherent in the activity in which the patron has paid to 
engage.”203  But, of course, Connelly actually held that  “colliding with a 
ski lift tower while skiing is an inherent risk within the doctrine of 
primary assumption of risk, and [thus the ski resort] owed no duty to [the 
injured skier] to protect him from this inherent risk.”204 
By its approving citation of Connelly and its repetition of Knight’s 
analysis of the mogul example, Parsons seems to be endorsing a no-duty 
rule that is independent of the framework and policies of the intentional 
injury/recklessness no-duty rule.  This is a no-duty rule applicable to 
what a court determines are inherent risks posed by commercial premises 
that provide recreational activities. 
A similar endorsement can be found in cases subsequent to Parsons.205  
 
 201. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 85. 
 202. Id. (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d at 708). 
 203. Id. at 87 (citing Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 204. Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 859 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 205. In Avila v. Citrus Community College District, 131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006), the 
case which extended the intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule to pitchers who 
throw at batters, the court also considered three alternative plaintiff theories which were 
unrelated to the court’s main holding regarding a pitcher intentionally hitting a batter.  Id. 
at 393.  The first of these was that the District breached a duty to the plaintiff by 
conducting the game in violation of the alleged rule prohibiting preseason games.  
Because hosting such a game only exposed players to the ordinary inherent risks of 
baseball, nothing about hosting the game enhanced those ordinary risks, and thus it did 
“not constitute a breach of its duty not to enhance the ordinarily risks of baseball.”  Id. 
Failing to provide umpires, which was another theory propounded by the plaintiff, 
“likewise did not increase the risks inherent in the game.”  Id. at 395.  Finally, the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant breached a duty to him by failing to provide medical care after 
he was injured.  Id.  The court, for a variety of reasons, doubted that the District owed such an 
affirmative duty.  Id. at 395–96.  But even if it did owe some duty, that duty was satisfied 
when the player’s own coaches were alerted to his condition.  Id. at 396. 
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For example, the court’s 2007 Shin v. Ahn golf participants decision206 
relied on American Golf Corp., the previously mentioned case, in 
which a golfer injured when a shot ricocheted off a wooden yard 
marker sued the golf course for negligent design and placement of the 
markers.207  The court of appeal applied the primary assumption of the 
risk doctrine, holding that the golf course “had no duty to protect [the 
plaintiff] from the inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot, and the 
primary assumption of the risk doctrine [barred plaintiff’s] action.”208  
The Shin court cited this holding approvingly.209  Thus, Shin can also be 
seen to endorse Knight’s no-duty-for-inherent-risk rule.210  But, as is 
 
Although the court analyzed these claims under the rubric of primary assumption of 
the risk and the duty not to increase risks inherent in a sport, nothing in the court’s brief 
analysis contradicts Justice Kennard’s conclusion, expressed in her dissent, that these 
claims “can be disposed of without resort to the no-duty-for-sports rule.”  Id. at 397 
(Kennard, J., dissenting).  The “District did not breach any duty to [the plaintiff] by 
conducting the game” in violation of the rule prohibiting preseason games.  Id. at 398.  
Similarly, “baseball games are often played without umpires, and there is no reason to 
impose on community colleges a duty to provide them.”  Id.  And finally, the “theory 
(that the District failed to provide medical care) fails because . . . the District had no duty 
to provide medical care when [the plaintiff’s] team came equipped with its own trainers, 
who were present to treat his injuries.”  Id. 
 206. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2007). 
 207. Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 208. Id. at 690.  In American Golf, the plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert in a 
declaration stated that the yardage marker was dangerous and defective because of its 
rigid and hard construction and its location near the fairway.  Id. at 686–87.  The court of 
appeal noted that it is “common in the golf industry for hard yardage markers to be 
utilized.”  Id. at 689.  The defendant’s “yardage marker system utilizing three wooden 
posts on each side of the fairway is found in 20 to 25 percent of the nation’s golf 
courses.”  Id.  From this, it concluded that “yardage markers are an integral part of the 
sport of golf, and the yardage marker system used at golf course is standard in the 
industry.”  Id.  The defendant “golf course did not increase the risk that [the plaintiff] 
would be struck by an errant shot by the construction or placement of the . . . yard 
marker.”  Id.  Therefore, the “golf course had no duty to protect [the plaintiff] from the 
inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot, and the primary assumption of the risk 
doctrine bars [the plaintiff’s] action.”  Id. at 690. 
 209. Shin, 165 P.3d at 587. 
 210. American Golf’s holding, and the Shin court’s approval of this holding, 
illustrates the ambiguities in the cases interpreting and applying the Knight no-duty rule.  
The question American Golf raises is what duty a golf course owes to its patrons with 
respect to design and placement of yard markers and other features of the golf course.  
The case applied the primary assumption of the risk doctrine and it relied on Dilger, a 
case involving a golfer’s duties.  This suggests that, like the golfer in Dilger, the golf 
course may only owe golfers a duty not to intentionally injure them or engage in conduct 
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.  On the other hand, 
both Knight and Kahn make clear that before the Knight no-duty rule is extended to 
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usually the case in these no-duty-for-sports cases, the matter is more 
complex than this. 
VI.  CLARIFYING DUTY 
The no-duty rules applicable to sporting activities have been the 
source of considerable, but unnecessary, confusion.  In our view, much 
of this confusion comes from the court’s carrying over terminology and 
concepts of the traditional assumption of risk defense, in particular the 
term assumption of risk itself and the concept of inherent risk.  Neither 
of these concepts serves the goals upon which Knight is premised.  
Indeed, the continued use of these concepts only frustrates these goals.  
Both should be eliminated. 
A.  Eliminating Use of the Assumption of the Risk Concept 
The no-duty-for-sports rule is just that: a no-duty rule.  Referring to 
the rule as “primary assumption of the risk” is misleading in that it 
implicitly directs attention to the plaintiff rather than to the defendant.  
But, as Knight makes clear, and the court subsequently reiterated, the 
“focus [is not] upon whether . . . [the] plaintiff subjectively knew of, and 
voluntarily chose to encounter, the risk of defendant’s conduct, or 
impliedly consented to relieve or excuse the defendant from any duty of 
care . . . .”211  As the court wrote in Parsons, “‘primary assumption of 
risk’ simply describes a subcategory of those cases in which the 
defendant has not breached a duty of care.”212 
By retaining the terminology of the traditional assumption of the risk 
doctrine, the court has created the danger that courts in the future will, 
perhaps inadvertently, lapse into pre-Knight assumption of the risk 
analysis, focusing on a plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or appreciation 
of the risk and consent to excuse a defendant from a duty of care, which 
the Knight court itself rejected.213  In fact, just this occurred in the 
 
owners of sports facilities, a court should examine not only the “nature of the sport,” but 
also the role of the defendant whose conduct is at issue.  Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 
709 (Cal. 1992).  And this examination should include an inquiry as to whether the 
Knight policies apply.  Neither the California Supreme Court in Shin nor the court of 
appeal in American Golf engaged in such an examination.  In fact, the court of appeal 
does not even mention the Knight recklessness standard. 
 211. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.  For an example of a reiteration of this statement, see 
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 85 (Cal. 1997) (quoting Knight, 834 P.2d 
at 708). 
 212. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 87 n.25 (emphasis omitted). 
 213. The Knight court itself seems to have lapsed into “pre-Knight” analysis.  Using 
the example of a ski resort which has been negligent in maintaining its towropes, the 
court wrote that even if the plaintiff “actually is aware that a particular ski resort on 
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court’s own 2006 decision in Priebe v. Nelson, in which the court wrote 
that the “defense of primary assumption of risk” would not bar a claim if 
the plaintiff did not know of a risk.214  If the risk was unknown to the 
plaintiff, the defense of assumption of the risk “would not bar [the] claim 
since [the plaintiff] could not be found to have assumed a risk of which 
[he or] she was unaware.”215  This, of course, directly contradicts Knight’s 
statement that its new no-duty (primary assumption of the risk) regime 
“does not depend on the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or 
appreciation of the potential risk.”216 
In Knight the court explained why it retained the assumption of risk 
terminology.  Because the court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. had “indicated 
that the preexisting assumption of risk doctrine was to be only partially 
merged into the comparative fault system,” the court believed that its 
“analysis . . . (distinguishing between primary and secondary assumption 
of risk) . . . more closely reflect[ed] the Li holding” than the proposal to 
abandon the assumption of risk terminology.217 
The court may technically be correct in its statement that its choice 
more closely reflected the Li holding, but the retention of risk terminology 
in Knight did not accurately capture what the court did in Li.  The court 
in Li broke with traditional doctrine by casting aside the defense of 
contributory negligence.218  It kept the assumption of risk terminology 
because it was not prepared in that case to rule on whether reasonable 
assumption of risk should also be subsumed into the comparative 
negligence equation.  And, even then, as the court has pointed out in 
Shin v. Ahn, the Li court did not employ the terminology of primary and 
secondary assumption of risk.219  That was introduced in Knight. 
 
occasion has been negligent in maintaining its towropes, that knowledge would not preclude 
the skier from recovering if he or she were injured as a result of the resort’s repetition of 
such deficient conduct.”  Knight, 834 P.2d at 709.  In this situation, “the plaintiff may 
have acted with knowledge of the potential negligence, [but] he or she did not consent to 
such negligent conduct or agree to excuse the resort from liability in the event of such 
negligence.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In apparent contradiction to this, the court wrote 
immediately after this sentence that “[r]ather than being dependent on the knowledge or 
consent of the particular plaintiff, resolution of the question of the defendant’s liability in 
such cases turns on whether the defendant had a legal duty to avoid such conduct or to 
protect the plaintiff against a particular risk of harm.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 214. 140 P.3d 848, 850 (Cal. 2006). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Knight, 834 P.2d at 709. 
 217. Id. at 707–08 n.6. 
 218. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975). 
 219. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 591 (Cal. 2007). 
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Just as the court in Li made a clean break from contributory negligence by 
adopting pure—as opposed to modified—comparative negligence, so the 
court now should abandon the assumption of the risk label and 
terminology.  In California over the past decade and a half—as had 
previously been the case in New Jersey—experience has shown that “the 
term ‘assumption of risk’ is so apt to create mist [rather than aid 
comprehension] that it is better banished from the scene.”220  The rule 
adopted in Knight should simply be called the no-duty-for-sports 
doctrine.221 
B.  Eliminating Use of the Inherent Risk Concept 
The inherent risk concept was carried over from the traditional, 
consent-based assumption of the risk cases.  The confusion created by 
the court’s use of the inherent risk concept and the apparent extension by 
courts of appeal of the inherent risk no-duty rule to protect owners of 
sports facilities, or commercial purveyors of recreational activities, 
suggest the need to reexamine this concept.  And the Knight decision is 
the place to start. 
In Knight the court wrote: 
Although defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a 
plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well established that 
defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a 
participant over and above those inherent in the sport.222 
As this sentence illustrates, the inherent risk concept serves two purposes: to 
identify the duty owed by a class of defendants to sports participants (not 
to increase inherent risks) and to limit duty (no duty to protect against 
inherent risks).  The inherent risk is unnecessary for the first purpose and 
undesirable when used for the second. 
 
 220. McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240–41 (N.J. 1963). 
 221. Another group of cases formerly analyzed under the assumption of the risk 
doctrine has also been restated in no-duty terms.  See Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609 
(Cal. 1977); Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1994).  This group of 
cases grew out of what was known as the “fireman’s rule,” which barred firefighters 
from bringing negligence actions against those who set fires.  See Levy & Ursin, supra 
note 4, at 529.  A similar rule has now been applied to police and veterinarian cases.  See 
Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848, 854 (Cal. 2006); Neighbarger, 882 P.2d at 355.  These 
cases have been called by the court “occupational assumption of the risk” cases.  See 
Priebe, 140 P.3d at 852. 
 222. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708. 
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1.  Unnecessary to Create Duties 
As we have seen, the statement that a defendant has a duty “to use due 
care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those 
inherent in the sport” does not tell us what duty a defendant owes.  This 
is because carelessness may or may not be considered an inherent risk of 
a sport.  When the court wrote in its 2006 Avila decision that “coaches 
and instructors have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports 
participation,” it also noted that “those responsible for maintaining 
athletic facilities have a similar duty not to increase the inherent 
risks.”223  Those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities, however, 
may in fact not have a duty similar to that owed by coaches and 
instructors.  Coaches and instructors do not have a duty of due care; 
those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities may have such a 
duty. 
Parsons makes clear that the statement that a defendant owes “a duty 
to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above 
those inherent in the sport”224 was not meant to create a general duty not 
to increase the risk inherent in whatever sporting or recreational activity 
plaintiff happens to be pursuing, regardless of the lack of relationship 
between the parties.225  Rather, the “statement . . . was made in the 
context . . . of the duty owed by parties who have some organized 
relationship with each other and to a sporting activity—in our example, 
that of ski resort and ski patron.”226  The inherent risk concept, however, 
is not necessary to establish this duty.  Under Rowland, ski resorts and 
others have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to others and may be 
held liable if their careless conduct injures another person.  Knight and 
Kahn carve out a no-duty exception for participants and coaches in 
active sports.  Others, including owners of sports facilities, such as ski 
resorts, and manufacturers of sporting equipment, owe a duty of due care 
unless brought within Knight or some other no-duty rule.227 
 
 223. Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2006). 
 224. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708. 
 225. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 86 (Cal. 1997). 
 226. Id. 
 227. As Parsons recognizes, “independent actors, separately pursuing their own 
activities” with no organized relationship with each other and to a sporting activity, may 
be found to have no duty to a sports participant after engaging in a “traditional duty 
inquiry utilizing the policy considerations set out in Rowland v. Christian.”  Id. at 87. 
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2.  The Conflict with the Court’s Analytic and Policy Framework 
Rulings under the inherent risk no-duty rule can have the undesirable 
effect of canceling out determinations made under Knight’s analytic and 
policy framework that a category of defendant should owe a duty of due 
care.  This effect can be seen in the line of golf no-duty cases, of which 
Shin is the culmination.  These cases trace back to a 1995 court of appeal 
decision in Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc.228  In Morgan the plaintiff, 
a golfer, had been hit by an errant tee shot from the fourth tee while 
standing near the fifth tee.229  Balls hit from the fourth tee had sailed 
over trees that stood between the fourth green and the fifth tee and 
landed on or near the fifth tee before and after removal of one of these 
trees.  The plaintiff in the past had stood under the now-removed tree for 
protection from flying golf balls.  The plaintiff brought an action against 
the owner of the golf course based on negligent design and maintenance 
of its golf course.230  The superior court granted summary judgment, 
holding that “primary assumption of the risk operated as a complete bar” 
to the plaintiff’s claim.231  However, the court of appeal reversed, holding 
that the “duty of a golf course towards a golfer is to provide a reasonably 
safe golf course.”232 
Morgan seems inconsistent with American Golf’s previously mentioned 
holding that a golf course has “no duty to protect [golfers] from the 
inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot.”233  However, these cases can 
be reconciled by recognizing that they are dealing with different no-duty 
rules.  Morgan dealt with the question whether owners of golf courses, 
like participants, would be liable only if they intentionally injure a golfer 
or “engage in conduct ‘that is so reckless as to be totally outside the 
range of the ordinary activity involved in’ [the sport].”234  The court held 
that the intentional injury/recklessness rule does not apply to owners of 
golf courses.  American Golf held that the analytically distinct inherent 
risk no-duty rule may apply. 
The Morgan court saw the issue before it to be the reach of Knight’s 
intentional injury/recklessness no-duty rule.  In deciding this issue, the 
court closely adhered to the Knight framework.  The court wrote that, 
under Knight, when one sports coparticipant injures another, the duty 
owed is “to not intentionally injure another player or to engage in 
 
 228. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 229. Id. at 250. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 251. 
 232. Id. at 253. 
 233. Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 683, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 234. Morgan, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253. 
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conduct ‘that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the 
ordinary activity involved in’ [the sport].”235  Thus, if the defendant in 
Morgan had been a coparticipant, “this would clearly be a primary 
assumption of the risk case under Knight and the defendant would have 
no liability” to the plaintiff.236 
Here, however, the plaintiff was “not suing the other player; he [was] 
suing the owner and operator of the golf course.”237  Under Knight, “before 
concluding a case falls within primary assumption of the risk it is not 
only necessary to examine the nature of the sport but also the ‘defendant’s 
role in, or relationship to, the sport.’”238  After quoting from Knight’s 
analysis of the different duties owed by ballplayers and stadium owners 
with respect to thrown bats, the court wrote that, like the stadium owner, 
the “owner and operator of the . . . golf course owes a different duty” 
than do coparticipants; the “duty of a golf course towards the golfer is to 
provide a reasonably safe golf course.”239  Quoting Knight, the court wrote 
that this duty “requires the golf course owner ‘to minimize the risks 
without altering the nature of the sport.’”240  Thus, “the owner of a 
golf course has an obligation to design a golf course to minimize the risk 
that players will be hit by golf balls, e.g., by the way the various tees, 
fairways, and greens are aligned or separated.”241  Again drawing on Knight, 
the court wrote: 
In certain areas of a golf course, because of the alignment or separation of the 
tee, fairway and/or greens, the golf course owner may also have a duty to 
provide protection for players from being hit with golf balls ‘where the greatest 
danger exists and where such an occurrence is reasonably to be expected . . .’ 
just as a baseball stadium owner may have a duty to provide protection for 
spectators from thrown bats or errant balls in that part of the stadium where the 
danger of being hit is particularly high and dangerous.242 
The Morgan court concluded that the owner and operator of the golf 
course “owed a duty of care to [the plaintiff] in the design and 
maintenance of its golf course.”243  The evidence indicated “the area of 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 252. 
 239. Id. at 253. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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the fifth tee was a particularly dangerous place due to the design of the 
fourth and fifth tees and the removal of the trees.”244  This evidence 
“could support a finding that [the golf course] breached the duty of care” 
to the plaintiff.245 
Morgan’s statement that Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness rule 
applies to golf participants technically was dictum.  But Dilger v. 
Moyles, a second court of appeal decision, so held.246  The Dilger court 
noted Morgan’s holding that a golf course owner owes “a duty of 
care . . . in the design and maintenance of its golf course” and the court’s 
statement that “if the relationship between the parties was one of 
coparticipants . . . this would clearly be a primary assumption of the risk 
case under Knight.”247  Closely adhering to the Knight framework, the 
Dilger court examined whether Knight’s policies applied to participants 
in the sport of golf.  It found that they did: 
   While golf may not be as physically demanding as . . . basketball or football, 
risk is nonetheless inherent in the sport.  Hitting a golf ball at a high rate of 
speed involves the very real possibility that the ball will take flight in an 
unintended direction. . . . 
   Holding participants liable for missed hits would only encourage lawsuits and 
deter players from enjoying the sport. . . . Social policy dictates that the law 
should not discourage participation in such an activity whose benefits to the 
individual player and to the community at large are so great.248 
Thus, the duty owed by one golfer to another was to not “intentionally 
injure[] . . . or engage[] in reckless conduct that is totally outside the 
range of the . . . sport.”249  In Dilger, the defendant had failed to warn the 
plaintiff of his errant shot.  “[W]hile possibly negligent, [this] did not breach 
a legal duty” to the plaintiff and thus summary judgment was appropriate.250 
In Shin v. Ahn, the California Supreme Court endorsed Dilger, holding 
that “the primary assumption of risk doctrine does apply to golf . . . .”251  
The court reiterated Dilger’s policy rationale, quoting the passage noted 
above.252  Shin thus held that “golfers have a limited duty of care to other 
players, breached only if they intentionally injure them or engage in 
conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the 
ordinary activity involved in the sport.”253 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 247. Id. at 594. 
 248. Id. at 593. 
 249. Id. at 594. 
 250. Id. 
 251. 165 P.3d 581, 583 (Cal. 2007). 
 252. Id. at 586–87. 
 253. Id. at 590. 
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Leaving American Golf aside for the moment, the law resulting from 
Morgan, Dilger, and Shin can be restated, and it is in line with what one 
could have predicted from the Knight case itself.  In suits between 
golfers, the policy of not chilling vigorous participation applies and the 
duty is to not intentionally injure or engage in conduct totally outside the 
range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.  In a suit by a golfer 
against the owner of a golf course, however, a court must examine the 
different role of, and relationship to, the sport of the golf course owner.  
The policy of not chilling vigorous participation does not apply in that 
situation.  As in the case of a stadium owner in Knight’s thrown bat 
example, the golf course owner owes golfers a full duty of reasonable 
care in the design and maintenance of its golf course. 
American Golf, of course, complicates matters.  In American Golf, the 
plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert in a declaration stated that the 
yardage marker was dangerous and defective because of its rigid and 
hard construction and its location near the fairway.  He “asserted that 
because of the design of the 13th hole, a golfer was likely to aim the tee 
shot in the direction of the 200-yard marker, thus making the marker a 
likely site for a ricochet shot” like the one that injured the plaintiff.254  In 
apparent contradiction to Morgan’s holding that a golf course owes a 
“duty of care to [a golfer] in the design and maintenance of its golf 
course,”255 the American Golf court held that the golf course “had no 
duty to protect [the golfer] from the inherent risk of being hit by an 
errant shot, and the primary assumption of the risk doctrine bar[red the 
golfer’s] action.”256 
The court, however, purported to follow Morgan and Dilger.  Citing 
Dilger, the court first held that “[g]olf is an active sport to which the 
assumption of the risk doctrine applies.”257  Then, quoting Morgan, the 
court wrote that the “duty of care a golf course [has] towards a golfer is 
to provide a reasonably safe golf course.”258  At this point, however, the 
 
 254. Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 255. Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 256. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690. 
 257. Id. at 689. 
 258. Id.  Also quoting from Morgan the court wrote that this duty care “requires the 
golf course owner ‘to minimize the risks without altering the nature of the sport.’”  Id.  
Thus 
a golf course has an obligation to design a golf course to minimize the risk that 
players will be hit by balls, e.g., by the way the various tees, fairways, and 
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American Golf court’s analysis departed from that of the Morgan and 
Dilger courts.  Those courts, it will be recalled, had focused on whether 
Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness rule applied to golfers and golf 
course owners and operators.  Thus, they had heeded Knight’s admonition 
that “before concluding a case falls within primary assumption of the risk 
it is not only necessary to examine the nature of the sport but also the 
‘defendant’s role in, or relationship to, the sport.’”259  Their conclusion was 
that whereas participants are protected by Knight’s intentional injury/ 
recklessness rule, golf courses are not; they owe a duty of due care. 
The American Golf court did not examine the golf course’s role in, or 
relationship to, golf in reaching its conclusion that the “primary 
assumption of the risk doctrine bar[red the plaintiff’s] action.”260  This 
was because its holding was not based on the intentional injury/ 
recklessness rule.  In fact, the court does not mention that rule.  Instead, 
it based its holding on the inherent risk no-duty rule. 
The court wrote that the “question of duty [is] a function of the scope 
and definition of a given active sport’s inherent risks.”261  Under this 
duty doctrine, “participation in an active sport is governed by primary 
assumption of risk, and a defendant owes no duty of care to protect a 
plaintiff against risks inherent in the sport.”262  Without pausing to consider 
whether the different role played by the owner and operator of a golf 
course should lead to a different duty, the court simply stated, “[u]nder 
the assumption of the risk doctrine, ordinarily a recreation provider owes 
no duty to a participant in an active sport to use due care to eliminate 
risks inherent in the sport.”263  It followed that the “golf course had no 
duty to protect [the plaintiff] from the inherent risk of being hit by an 
errant shot . . . .”264 
The golf duty cases demonstrate the potential of the inherent risk no-
duty rule to trump determinations made under the analytic and policy 
frameworks carefully articulated under Knight’s intentional injury/recklessness 
rule.  Employing this framework, the Dilger court held that owners and 
operators of golf courses owe golfers who are hit by errant shots a duty 
 
greens are aligned or separated.  In certain areas of a golf course, because of 
the alignment or separation of the tee, fairway and/or greens, the golf course 
owner may also have a duty to provide protection for players from being hit 
with golf balls ‘where the greatest danger exists and where such an occurrence 
is reasonably to be expected’ . . . .   
Id. (quoting Morgan, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 253). 
 259. Morgan, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252. 
 260. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690. 
 261. Id. at 688. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 687–88. 
 264. Id. at 690. 
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of care in the design and maintenance of golf courses.265  The American 
Golf court agreed with this conclusion.266  Then, turning to the inherent 
risk no-duty rule, it held that the owner and operator of the “golf course 
[had] no duty to protect [the golfer hit by the ricochet] from the inherent 
risk of being hit by an errant shot.”267 
This holding, and similar holdings under the inherent risk no-duty 
rule,268 are troubling.  Unlike duty rulings under the intentional injury/ 
recklessness rule, they are not guided by the policy of not chilling vigorous 
participation in a sport.  Nor are they sensitive to the defendant’s role in, 
or relationship to, the sport.  In fact, rulings under the inherent risk no-
duty rule can cancel out determinations based on those considerations 
that an owner or operator of a sporting facility owes a duty of due care to 
a patron.  In addition, these rulings ignore Rowland policy considerations of 
special significance in the case of commercial enterprises: “the policy of 
preventing future harm” and “the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved.”269  By doing so, they undercut policies 
that are central to the law governing commercial premises liability.270  
Also, as we discuss next, the inherent risk no-duty decisions can be, and 
have been, criticized for impinging on the proper role of juries. 
3.  The Role of Judge and Jury 
Critics of California’s no-duty-for-sports regime have aimed special 
criticism at what they see as the willingness by the California Supreme 
Court and lower courts to usurp the role that properly should be assigned 
to juries.  Esper and Keating, for example, write: 
The . . . basic role played by duty doctrine is to divide the labor of negligence 
law between judge and jury.  Judges determine whether the defendant’s conduct 
will be judged by the standard of reasonable care, and juries apply that standard 
to particular controversies, even when its application involves the exercise of 
evaluative judgment.  The evaluative role of the jury is one of the most 
distinctive features of negligence adjudication.271 
 
 265. Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 266. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See, e.g., Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 857 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 269. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
 270. See Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 36 P.3d 11, 19 (Cal. 2001); Sugarman, supra note 
48, at 867; Ursin, Business Premises, supra note 5, at 821. 
 271. See Esper & Keating, supra note 12, at 270 (emphasis omitted). 
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They complain that Knight and subsequent “primary assumption of risk 
cases assign both the choice of legal standard and its application to the 
facts to the judge.”272  Under Knight, “trial and appellate courts are asked 
to make factual findings as to what risks are inherent in common 
activities.”273 
That criticism, as we will discuss, has merit when directed at decisions 
invoking the inherent risk no-duty rule.  It cannot, however, be fairly 
directed at the California Supreme Court’s adoption and application of 
the intentional injury/recklessness rule. 
In Knight, the court decided that the conduct of a participant in an 
active sport would not be judged by the standard of reasonable care.  
Instead, it held that participants would be liable only if they intentionally 
injure another participant or “engage in conduct that is so reckless as to 
be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in” the 
sport.274  Whether or not one agrees with the policy judgment that led to 
the adoption of this rule, the court in adopting it was performing the role 
traditionally assigned to courts—it was determining the standard by 
which the conduct of a category of defendants would be judged. 
In Knight, the parties were participating in a coed game of touch 
football when the defendant knocked the plaintiff to the ground, stepped 
on her hand, and injured her finger.275  It is true that the court affirmed 
the trial court’s granting of summary judgment.276  The court did not, 
however, usurp the jury’s role.  It is for the jury to determine if a defendant 
intentionally injured a plaintiff or engaged in reckless conduct that is 
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport—if 
the facts are such that a reasonable jury could so determine.  In Knight, 
the court held that the “conduct alleged . . . [was] not even closely 
comparable to the kind of conduct—conduct so reckless as to be totally 
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport—that is a 
prerequisite to the imposition of legal liability upon a participant in such 
a sport.”277 
The court’s most recent primary assumption of risk decision, Shin v. 
Ahn, underscores this point.  The plaintiff and defendant in that case 
were playing golf together.278  Plaintiff was standing in front of the tee 
box twenty-five to thirty-five feet from the defendant at a forty to forty-
five degree angle from the intended path of defendant’s tee shot as the 
 
 272. Id. at 271 (emphasis omitted). 
 273. Id. at 297; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13, at 343. 
 274. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992). 
 275. Id. at 697. 
 276. Id. at 712. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.2d 581, 583 (Cal. 2007). 
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defendant teed off.279  The defendant “inadvertently ‘pulled’ his tee shot 
to the left, hitting plaintiff in the temple.”280  There was dispute over 
whether the defendant knew where the plaintiff was standing.281  The 
trial court denied the defendant’s summary judgment motion.282  The 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the “record [was] . . . too sparse to 
support a finding, as a matter of law, that defendant did, or did not, act 
recklessly.  This will be a question the jury will ultimately resolve based 
on a more complete examination of the facts.”283  Shin “makes clear that 
the issue of recklessness of a defendant’s action is an issue for the trier 
of fact . . . [unless] no reasonable jury could find defendant’s actions so 
reckless as to be outside the ordinary activity [involved in the sport].”284 
If the Supreme Court’s decisions involving the intentional injury/ 
recklessness rule cannot be accused of usurping the jury’s role, the same 
cannot be said of lower court decisions employing the inherent risk no-
duty rule.  Unlike the former decisions, decisions under the inherent risk 
no-duty rule do not involve the choice of the legal standard to be 
assigned to categories of activity.  These decisions are not about categories 
of activity; they are about the facts of particular cases. 
Knight’s use of the mogul example to introduce the inherent risk 
concept is illustrative.  The court wrote that although “a ski resort has no 
duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use 
due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as not 
to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm.”285  In the towrope 
example, the “risk[] posed by a ski resort’s negligence[] clearly is not a 
risk (inherent in the sport) that is assumed by a participant.”286  Since the 
defendant in the mogul and towrope examples is the same—the owner of 
the ski resort—the no-duty-for-inherent risk rule the court invokes in the 
case of the mogul is not a rule applicable to all risks posed by the 
operation of the resort.  Rather, it is a rule based on finding a particular 
risk to be “inherent.” 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 583–84. 
 283. Id. at 592. 
 284. Neil M. Levy, Commentary, Primary Assumption of Risk: Levy on Shin v. 
Ahn, available at 2007 CAL. LEXIS 10356. 
 285. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992). 
 286. Id. at 708. 
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Court of appeal decisions that find particular risks to be inherent 
follow this pattern.  In these decisions, courts state fact-specific conclusions 
with no felt need to articulate any criteria that may have guided their 
decisionmaking.  Moreover, trial and appellate courts in these cases do 
“make factual findings as to what risks are inherent in common 
activities.” 
The American Golf decision provides an example—and a contrast—to 
the Supreme Court’s Shin decision under the intentional injury/recklessness 
rule.  In American Golf, it will be recalled, the plaintiff’s accident 
reconstruction expert stated in a declaration that the yardage marker was 
dangerous and defective because of its rigid and hard construction and 
its location near the fairway.  He “asserted that because of the design of 
the 13th hole, a golfer was likely to aim the tee shot in the direction of 
the 200-yard marker, thus making the marker a likely site for a ricochet 
shot,” such as the one that hit the plaintiff.287 
Despite this declaration, the court of appeal ordered that the defendant 
golf course’s summary judgment motion be granted on the basis of 
primary assumption of the risk.288  The court noted that it is “common in 
the golf industry for hard yardage markers to be utilized.”289  The defendant’s 
“yardage marker system utilizing three wooden posts on each side of the 
fairway is found on 20 to 25 percent of the nation’s golf courses.”290  
From this, it concluded that “yardage markers are an integral part of the 
sport of golf, and the yardage marker system used at golf course is 
standard in the industry.”291  The defendant “golf course did not increase 
the risk that [the plaintiff] would be struck by an errant shot by the 
construction or placement of the . . . yard marker.”292 
The plaintiff in this case was hit by a ball when a hooked shot struck a 
removable obstacle, which was not in the line of play and had not been 
removed.  There had been “no prior reports of injuries caused by the 
construction or location of either this particular yardage marker or any of 
the 84 removable wooden yardage markers located in the rough on both 
sides of 14 fairways.”  This was “not an area of great danger or a place 
where such occurrences could reasonably be expected.”293  Thus, the 
court held that the “golf course had no duty to protect [the plaintiff] from 
 
 287. Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 686–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 288. Id. at 690. 
 289. Id. at 689. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 689–90. 
URSIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 9/4/2008  11:30:47 AM 
[VOL. 45:  383, 2008]  California’s No-Duty-for-Sports Regime 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 433 
the inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot, and the primary 
assumption of the risk doctrine [barred plaintiff’s] action.”294 
The “[p]laintiff’s expert’s opinion that this particular yardage marker 
should have been located farther from the fairway or made of a softer 
material [was] not sufficient to create a duty on the part of golf 
course.”295  And, “[i]n any event, all of the plaintiff’s expert’s objections 
to the location and construction of the yardage markers [were] negated 
by the fact that the markers are indisputably visible to the players and 
removable at the player’s discretion.”296 
The criticism of “appellate courts [making] factual findings as to what 
risks are inherent in common activities”297 can fairly be aimed at American 
Golf and other decisions298 under the inherent risk no-duty rule.  These 
decisions can be fairly characterized as employing a standardless 
inherent risk no-duty rule to improperly usurp the role assigned to juries 
in our negligence system.  As we will discuss shortly, it may well be that 
summary judgment was appropriate in American Golf; but it was not 
appropriate on the ground that the golf course “had no duty to protect 
[the plaintiff] from the inherent risk of being hit by an errant shot.”299  
Rather, this may have been a case in which the court could appropriately 
rule as a matter of law that the defendant had not been negligent. 
4.  No Negligence as a Matter of Law? 
The mogul example, which is used by Knight as well as commentators 
to illustrate the inherent risk concept, also illustrates the point that 
inherent risk cases can be better understood as cases in which courts may 
appropriately rule as a matter of law that a defendant has not been 
negligent.  Neither Knight in discussing the mogul example nor the court 
of appeal decisions applying the inherent risk no-duty rule have offered 
criteria for identifying what risks are inherent (moguls, ski towers, 
yardage markers) and what risks are not (towropes).  Commentators 
have, however, attempted to fill that void. 
 
 294. Id. at 690. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Esper & Keating, supra note 12, at 270. 
 298. See, e.g., Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995). 
 299. Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690. 
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For example, Catherine Hansen-Stamp has suggested that “[i]nherent 
risks fall into two general categories: 1) those risks that are essential 
characteristics of a recreational activity and. . .that participants desire to 
confront: e.g., moguls, steep grades, exciting whitewater; and 2) those 
undesirable risks which simply exist, e.g., falling rock or sudden, severe 
weather changes.”300  Dylan Esper and Gregory Keating have offered a 
variation of this.  They write that “‘inherent risks’ of recreational activities 
are constitutive of their character and essential to their enjoyment.  
Eliminate those risks and you destroy or degrade the activity.”301  These 
are risks that are “essential to the challenge and pleasure of the activities 
that occasion them.”302  For example, if you “[e]liminate mogul fields 
from expert ski slopes[,] you eliminate a characteristic which makes 
expert runs more challenging and demanding than intermediate ones.”303  
Although these definitions are similar and the mogul example is 
common to both—and is Knight’s central example—their use of the 
mogul example points to the problem with the inherent risk concept: to 
state that a risk is “inherent” merely states a conclusion that there is no 
duty. 
When these authors, and the court in Knight, cite moguls as an 
inherent risk of skiing and write that a ski resort has “no duty to remove 
moguls from a ski run,” they undoubtedly have a particular type of ski 
run in mind.  Esper and Keating, for example, write that moguls are a 
“characteristic which makes expert runs more challenging and demanding 
than intermediate ones.”304  But what about moguls on an intermediate or 
beginner run? 
Decades ago, moguls were accepted as part of the sport of skiing and 
skiers “got what nature offered.”305  Skiing over moguls poses a risk.  
“Navigating a field of moguls requires speed, superhuman quads and the 
bones and cartilage to withstand knee-jarring, lower-back-compressing 
drops from mini-hill to valley.”  Moguls “can dislodge skis, throwing 
heels over heads and poles, hats and goggles flying.”306  Nevertheless, it 
might have made sense at one time to say that it is reasonable for a ski 
resort not to remove moguls from slopes.  Indeed, it might have been 
close to impossible to do so. 
 
 300. Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming’s 
Recreational Safety Act—An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 249, 251 (1998). 
 301. Esper & Keating, supra note 12, at 298. 
 302. Id. at 299. 
 303. Id. at 298–99. 
 304. Id. at 298 (emphasis added). 
 305. A mogul is a mound that forms wherever skiers turn repeatedly.  Hannah 
Nordhaus, The Big Combover, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004 at F4. 
 306. Id. 
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In the last two decades, however, things have changed.  As early as the 
1950s, ski areas began to look for ways to reduce moguls.  In the 1960s, 
the “Sno-Cat,” a tracked vehicle towing a twenty-foot-wide culvert, had 
been developed.307  And in “the mid-1980s . . . manufacturers added blades 
to push snow back uphill and tillers to comb the hard pack into the silky 
corduroy that many skiers now expect.”308  In fact, ski areas now refer to 
snow on their slopes as “product” that they “groom” with Sno-Cats to 
“smooth away any wrinkles or blemishes that might scare their best 
customers: jet-loads of risk-averse baby boomers.”309  Today, grooming 
of slopes is a marketing tool to attract skiers.  Ads for ski areas tout “the 
most groomed terrain on the planet,” and ski areas may groom beginner 
and intermediate slopes daily, do lunch-time “touch-ups,” and email 
maps to hotels that point out the day’s corduroy.310 
If a ski resort’s employees carelessly failed to groom the intermediate 
and beginner slopes and a skier on the first run of the day, not 
expecting—and unable to navigate—“mini-hills and valleys,” were to go 
tumbling “heels over head,” we doubt that the court would conclude that 
the ski resort has no duty to protect the injured skier from this risk.  This 
situation is analogous to the court’s towrope example in which the court 
wrote that the resort “clearly does have a duty to use due care to 
maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as not to expose 
skiers to an increased risk of harm.”311  Similarly, we believe a ski resort 
clearly does have a duty to use due care to maintain its beginner and 
intermediate slopes in a reasonably safe condition so as not to expose 
skiers to an increased risk of harm. 
The court’s statement that a ski resort has “no duty to remove moguls 
from a ski run” might better be understood as a statement that, as a 
matter of law, it is reasonable not to remove moguls on appropriate—
that is, advanced—ski runs.  Just as it is reasonable to have slopes that 
are steep even though they pose some danger, it is also reasonable to 
have slopes with moguls for advanced skiers.  These conditions do pose 
some danger, but if the ski resort appropriately marks its trails as 
advanced, intermediate, or beginner, these markers and the obviousness 
of the danger satisfy the obligation to warn, and this warning satisfies the 
 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992). 
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resort’s duty of due care.  The resort has a duty of due care, but as a 
matter of law the resort is not negligent.  Courts and commentators at 
times use “no-duty” as a shorthand reference for the conclusion that as a 
matter of law a duty of due care has been satisfied,312 and the mogul 
reference is an example of this tendency. 
Likewise, Connelly and American Golf might be better explained as 
instances in which no negligence existed as a matter of law.  These cases 
can be seen to involve negligent design of recreational facilities.  
Changing the facts in Connelly or American Golf, by placing the ski 
tower in the middle of a narrow beginner ski run or the yardage markers 
in a riskier location, might well make a holding that the defendants were 
reasonable as a matter of law inappropriate.  A no-duty rule would not be 
fact sensitive in this manner. 
Treating the mogul example, Connelly, and American Golf as instances of 
“no negligence” is preferable to treating them as announcing a no-duty 
rule.  It is widely recognized,313 and the court has acknowledged,314 that 
in determining questions of duty the focus is on a category of conduct, 
not on the specific facts of a case.  In contrast, “no negligence” determinations 
are based on the particular facts of a case.  The inherent risk rulings are 
of the latter type.  As the towrope and ungroomed beginner or intermediate 
slope examples illustrate, it would be inappropriate to hold that ski 
resorts have no duty of due care in the maintenance of their sporting 
facilities.  However, on the facts of a particular case, it might be appropriate 
to rule that a ski resort was reasonable as a matter of law. 
Moreover, whereas the inherent risk concept is standardless, the “no 
negligence” approach focuses the court’s attention on the variables that 
should guide its decision.  In the familiar Learned Hand formulation, the 
focus is on “the magnitude of the loss if an accident occurs; the 
probability of the accident’s occurring; and the burden of taking 
precautions that would avert it.”315 
 
 312. See Sugarman, supra note 48, at 842; see also Esper & Keating, supra note 12, 
at 284. 
 313. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 8 cmt. b, 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); Robert Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence Law: 
A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787, 791 (2001); Sugarman, supra note 48, at 843. 
 314. Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 85 (Cal. 1997). 
 315. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 
(1972). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
It is time for the California Supreme Court to bring clarity to the no-
duty-for-sports rules that have developed in the decade and a half since 
its Knight decision.  The first step is the easiest.  The court should simply 
eliminate the assumption of the risk concept from its jurisprudence.  That 
term serves no analytic purpose and can, misleadingly, direct attention to 
the plaintiff’s conduct or state of mind.316  As the court has recognized, 
“‘primary assumption of the risk’ simply describes a subcategory of 
those cases in which the defendant has not breached a duty of care.”317 
The court should also make clear that Knight creates a single no-duty-
for-sports rule.  This is the intentional injury/recklessness rule that has 
been the basis of the court’s holdings in this area.  The court has 
established a clear analytic and policy framework to determine whether 
this rule protects a particular category of defendants.  The policy question is 
whether “recognizing a duty of care . . . would tend to alter the nature of 
[a] sport or chill vigorous participation in the activity.”318  Based on this 
policy, Knight and Kahn held that participants, coaches, and sports 
instructors do not owe a full duty of due care to sports participants.  
Rather, they breach a duty of care “only if [they] intentionally injure [the 
plaintiff] or engage[] in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally 
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.”319  
 
 316. In Priebe v. Nelson, for example, the court wrote that “the defense of primary 
assumption of risk” would not bar a claim if the plaintiff did not know of a risk.  140 
P.3d 848, 850 (Cal. 2006).  If the risk was unknown to the plaintiff, the defense of 
assumption of the risk “would not bar [the] claim since [the plaintiff] could not be found 
to have assumed a risk of which [he or] she was unaware.”  Id.  This, of course, directly 
contradicts Knight’s statement that its new no-duty primary assumption of the risk regime 
“does not depend on the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or appreciation of the 
potential risk.”  Knight, 834 P.2d at 709. 
 317. Parsons, 936 P.2d at 87 n.25.  When a plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of 
injury caused by a defendant’s breach of a duty of care, the amount of the plaintiff’s 
recovery is determined by comparative fault principles.  The term “secondary assumption 
of risk” serves no purpose. 
 318. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 43 (Cal. 2003). 
 319. Knight, 834 P.2d at 711; see Kahn, 75 P.3d. at 38–39 (quoting id.).  As 
previously discussed, the Avila decision might be read to alter this holding.  It is best 
read as creating an exception—specific to baseball—under which pitchers have no duty 
to refrain from throwing at batters. 
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Whether a defendant’s conduct meets this standard is a question for the 
jury unless no reasonable jury could find the standard to be met.320 
The court has also provided a framework for determining whether the 
protection of the intentional injury/recklessness rule extends to categories of 
defendants other than participants, coaches, and sports instructors.  These 
other categories include owners of sports facilities and manufacturers of 
sports equipment.  Because “the question of duty depends not only on 
the nature of the sport, but also on the ‘role of the defendant whose 
conduct is at issue,’” a court, in addressing this question, should examine 
the “role of the [defendant] . . . and the likely effect . . . of imposing [a 
duty of due care].”321  Owners of sports facilities and manufacturers of 
sports equipment have been,322 and should be, held to a duty of care—
the result foreshadowed by the court’s distinction between the separate 
duties owed by a baseball batter and a stadium owner with respect to a 
thrown bat.323  Imposing such a duty would not alter the nature of a sport 
and is called for by the policy considerations especially relevant to and 
underlying the law of premises and products liability, including the 
“policy of preventing future harm” and “the availability, cost, and prevalence 
of insurance.”324 
In Knight, the court wrote that although “moguls on a ski run pose a 
risk of harm to skiers,” a “ski resort has no duty to eliminate them.”325  
This was said to be because moguls are an “inherent risk” of the sport of 
skiing and “defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or 
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.”326  This 
statement has been seen to create a second, distinct “no-duty-for-inherent 
risk” rule, which has been employed in cases like Connelly—the ski lift 
tower case—to protect owners of sports facilities from a duty of care.327  
This so-called inherent risk no-duty rule has been the focus of academic 
critics who have accused the court of “abusing duty”328 and who have 
 
 320. Compare Knight, 834 P.2d at 712 (holding there is no jury question because 
the defendant’s conduct was “not even closely comparable to” recklessness) with Shin v. 
Ahn, 165 P. 3d 581, 592 (Cal. 2007) (finding this question as being one for the jury to 
decide “based on more complete examination of the facts”). 
 321. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 38. 
 322. See Ford v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); 
Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 323. Kahn, 75 P.3d at 38. 
 324. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968); see Ortega v. Kmart 
Corp., 36 P.3d 11, 19 (Cal. 2001). 
 325. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708. 
 326. Id. 
 327. See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 328. Esper & Keating, supra note 12. 
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seen a need to “shield” the duty concept from such abuse.329  None of the 
California Supreme Court’s holdings, however, has been based on this 
no-duty rule,330 and we believe it is time for the court to make clear that 
no such rule exists. 
As the court recognized in Parsons, and as was true in its adoption of 
the intentional injury/recklessness rule, determinations of duty focus on a 
category of conduct—not the specific facts of a case.331  But the focus of 
the inherent risk no-duty rule—the second no-duty rule—is all about the 
facts of the specific case.332  This is an inappropriate use of the duty 
concept.  Unlike determinations under the intentional injury/recklessness 
rule, fact-specific determinations under the standardless inherent risk no-
duty rule usurp the role that is properly assigned to juries in our negligence 
system.  Moreover, such determinations can have the undesirable effect 
of trumping determinations, made under the Knight framework, that a 
particular category of defendants, such as operators of sports facilities, 
owes a sports participant a duty of due care.333  If cases such as Connelly 
were correctly decided, it was because, on the facts of the particular 
case, there was no negligence as a matter of law.334 
The court seems to have believed that the inherent risk concept is 
necessary to identify the duty owed by persons who have a relationship 
to a sporting activity.  Thus, it has written that such persons owe a duty 
“to use due care not to increase the risk to a participant over and above 
those inherent in the sport.”  In fact, however, the inherent risk concept 
is not needed to identify the duty owed by persons who have a 
relationship to a sporting activity.  Under Rowland, such persons owe a 
baseline duty of care,335 which would include a duty to use due care not 
to increase the risks to a participant over and above the so-called 
 
 329. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 13. 
 330. The court in Knight did state that “careless conduct of [sports participants] is 
treated as an ‘inherent risk’ of a sport.”  834 P.2d at 708.  That, however, was merely a 
linguistic characterization.  The decision to exempt sports participants from a duty of due 
care was based on the policy of not chilling vigorous participation in the sport.  See Kahn 
v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003). 
 331. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 8 cmt. b (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 332. See Am. Golf Corp. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 333. Compare Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 253 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1995) with Am. Golf, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689. 
 334. See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 335. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
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inherent risks of the sport336—unless a court determines, for reasons of 
policy, that no duty is owed.337  Moreover, the statement that a defendant 
owes a duty “to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant 
over and above those inherent in the sport” is meaningless.  It does not 
tell us what duty is owed.  This is because carelessness is considered an 
inherent risk of a sport with respect to some defendants, but not as to 
others.  In fact, the only real use of the inherent risk concept is to cause 
confusion.  But there is already too much confusion in the no-duty-for-
sports case law.  The court can bring clarity to the law by eliminating the 
use of the inherent risk concept.338 
 
 
 336. See Ford v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“Determination of whether a particular design increased the inherent risks . . . would 
necessarily focus on the ingredients of a risk/benefit analysis . . . .”). 
 337. See Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 87 (Cal. 1997). 
 338. It is not that the word inherent is, in itself, so bad.  If it were merely used as an 
adjective—like intrinsic or characteristic—there would be no problem.  The problem is 
that it is used as a substitute for analysis.  And this misuse is embedded in the case law. 
